SELECTED 7th CIRCUIT COURT
OF APPEALS ADA/504 CASES
Cases highlited in blue are linked to the actual decision in Findlaw
Return to Selected Americans With Disabilities Act/504 Cases Court's Index
Ligas ex rel. Foster v. Maram, --- F.3d --- (2/2007) The appellants are the representatives
of a number of developmentally disabled people who were worried that they might
have been unwilling members of a proposed class in a lawsuit filed under the
Americans with Disabilities Act. Fearing that the remedy being sought by
the plaintiffs was contrary to their wishes, they sought to intervene. The
plaintiffs and defendants opposed the intervention, and the district court
denied the petition. The intervenors appeal that decision, and we affirm.
Kampmier v. Emeritus Corp., 472 F.3d 930 (1/ 2007)
Because Kampmier has not offered evidence that she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA, her ADA failure to
accommodate and retaliation claims are without merit.
Timmons v. General Motors Corp., 469 F.3d 1122 (12/2006) Dock Timmons (“Timmons”), who suffers from multiple sclerosis,
sued General Motors (“GM”) for violating the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., after GM involuntarily placed him on disability leave. The district court
awarded summary judgment to GM and Timmons appeals. He claims the district court applied the wrong legal test to his case and the evidence establishes a material factual dispute regarding GM’s reason for placing him on disability leave. We
Cassimy v. Board of Educ. of Rockford Public Schools, Dist.
#??205, 461 F.3d 932 (9/2006) Here, the record shows that Cassimy told members of the
Board that he was being treated for depression and anxiety,
and that the Board received medical records indicating
that he was being treated for these conditions. What it does
not show, however, was that the Board “held exaggerated
views about the seriousness of his illness.”
305 F.3d at 768.
To the contrary, Brown testified that he was aware
that Cassimy suffered from depression and anxiety and
had sought medical help for this problem, but that
“at no time was the doctor characterizing Mr. Cassimy as
disabled, only that there was an illness.” We conclude, in light of all this, that the
facts in the light most favorable to Cassimy do not show that he
either had a disability for ADA purposes, or that the Board
regarded him as having a disability. This finding is
enough to support the district court’s decision to grant
summary judgment in the Board’s favor on both the
discrimination claim and the failure-to-accommodate claim. Cassimy is unable to show that only he, among a
group of otherwise similarly situated employees, was
treated adversely by the Board; he has no other direct
or circumstantial evidence of retaliation; and he offers no
evidence that would support a finding that the Board’s
stated reasons were pretextual. The district court
therefore correctly granted summary judgment for the Board
on the retaliation claim also.
Yindee v. CCH Inc., 458 F.3d 599 August 11, 2006 Because no evidence in the record would allow a reasonable jury to find that
Yindee’s vertigo is an aspect of her genuine disability
(infertility), she does not have a sound claim of disability
discrimination under the ADA. (This means that we need not decide
whether a medical condition or symptom associated with a
disability must be accommodated independently, when the
associated condition is not serious enough to be a
disability on its own.) Yindee has not created a material dispute about the pretext question,
so CCH is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.
Scheerer v. Potter, 443 F.3d 916 (4/2006)the district court held
that Scheerer could not establish that he suffered a substantial
limitation in major ife activities, such as walking, eating,
sleeping, or sexual reproduction. The record does not indicate
otherwise. Although there can be no doubt that Scheerer
suffered from pain and significant inconvenience from his
progressively worsening diabetic condition, he does not point
to enough evidence in the record to show that he was
prevented from performing, or was otherwise severely restricted
in, any major life activities. During the pertinent time period, Scheerer did not experience many of the more
severe symptoms of diabetes, including severe
hypoglycemia, seizures, or loss of consciousness. This
suggests that his diabetes had not yet worsened to such a stage
where it severely restricted his major life activities.
v. ExxonMobil Corp., 426 F.3d 887 (10/ 2005) Unlike Cleveland, where
the plaintiff's argued that she made consistent statements in her ADA claim and the SSDI
application, Johnson merely argues that he was mistaken in his SSDI application.As this
court has noted, Cleveland does not stand for the proposition that defendants
should be allowed to explain why they gave false statements on their SSDI applications,
which is essentially what Johnson seeks to do here. See Opsteen v. Keller Structures,
Inc., 408 F.3d 390, 392 (7th Cir. 2005) ("[C]ontradictions are unacceptable: a
person who applied for disability benefits must live with the factual representations made
to obtain them, and if these show inability to do the job then an ADA claim my be rejected
without further inquiry.").
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,417 F.3d 789 (8/2005) Our task has not been to
determine whether Keane was disabled when she worked at Sears, whether Sears was aware of
her disability, whether Sears reasonably accommodated Keane's disability, or which party
caused the breakdown of the interactive process. Rather, we have merely concluded that
there is sufficient evidence to allow each of these questions to be presented to a jury.
Accordingly, we REVERSE the entry of summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee Sears
and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
v. Thermafiber, Inc., 417 F.3d 657 (7/2005) We conclude that Thermafiber
produced sufficient evidence for the district court to conclude as a matter of law that
Darnell's uncontrolled diabetes made him a direct threat to his own safety and that of his
co-workers, his relatively brief work history notwithstanding. As a final matter, Darnell
argues that Thermafiber failed to consider making reasonable accommodations for his
disability, such as allowing him to take additional food and water breaks. This is
inaccurate. Dr. McCann assumed that Thermafiber would afford such opportunities in
rendering his assessment. McCann Dep. at 32. Moreover, it was Darnell's longstanding
failure to exercise good judgment in 10 No. 04-2170 treating his diabetes and taking care
of himself that was the very reason Thermafiber deemed him unsafe.
v. City of Chicago, 414 F.3d 806, (7/2005.) In sum, on the record
before us, we must conclude that Ms. Jackson is not a person with a disability who,
subject to reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the police
officer position. It is clear that being able to carry a firearm safely is an essential
function of the police officer position; it is equally clear that, due to her
fibromyalgia, Ms. Jackson is not capable of handling safely a weapon. Furthermore, to the
extent that Ms. Jackson is claiming that the City has abandoned its obligation to find her
a position working for the City outside of the Chicago Police Department, we must conclude
that Ms. Jackson failed to engage in the interactive process.
Wisconsin Community Services, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 413 F.3d
642 (6/2005) Much of the testimony before the Board of Zoning Appeals evinced
antipathy to a mental-health clinic that would include many released convicts among its
clientele. That some witnesses exemplified the "not in my back yard" approach
does not necessarily mean that the Board took that (forbidden) view, but it did refer to
community opposition as one reason for its decision. This implies that if WCS or some
other organization had proposed to use the same building to perform checkups for a HMO or
provide outpatient kidney dialysis, the Board might well have said yes. Such a difference
in treatment would be discriminatory, and WCS would be entitled to relief under federal
law. Whether the Board acted with discriminatory intent is a question of fact whose
resolution belongs in the first instance to the district court. See Pullman-Standard v.
Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982). The court may need to take
additional evidence on this subject, rather than limit consideration to the record made
before the Board, as it has done so far.The parties have devoted considerable energy to
debating whether the proposed accommodation is reasonable, if one is required in order to
overcome intentional discrimination or disparate impact. It is. See Oconomowoc
Residential Programs, Inc. v. Milwaukee, 300 F.3d 775 (7th Cir.2002). Milwaukee is
barking up the wrong tree in arguing that federal judges must "defer" to local
zoning codes when deciding what accommodations are reasonable. Federal statutes supersede
state and local rules; the question whether an accommodation is required is one of federal
law, though the extent to which a proposed accommodation would disrupt state policy must
weigh in the balance, as Barnett and its predecessors show. See also, e.g., Ansonia
Board of Education v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 67-69, 107 S.Ct. 367, 93 L.Ed.2d 305
(1986) (discussing accommodation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Trans
World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84, 97 S.Ct. 2264, 53 L.Ed.2d 113
(1977) (same). Our difficulty with the district court's resolution concerns the initial
question whether WCS is entitled to any accommodation, and that is the issue on
which the parties now should concentrate their attention
v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 411 F.3d 831 (6/2005) We accept Dr. Koransky's
contention that a high score on the Pa scale does not necessarily mean that the person has
paranoid personality disorder. But it also seems likely that a person who does, in fact,
have paranoid personality disorder, and is therefore protected under the ADA, would
register a high score on the Pa scale. And that high score could end up costing the
applicant any chance of a promotion. Because it is designed, at least in part, to reveal
mental illness and has the effect of hurting the employment prospects of one with a mental
disability, we think the MMPI is best categorized as a medical examination. And even
though the MMPI was only a part (albeit a significant part) of a battery of tests
administered to employees looking to advance, its use, we conclude, violated the ADA.
v. Koch Air, LLC, 410 F.3d 376 (6/2005) the district court granted Koch Air's
motion for summary judgment, finding that Rooney had failed to submit evidence showing
that a similarly situated nondisabled employee had been treated more favorably than he
was. While this may be so, we affirm for a more fundamental reason: he has not shown that
he is disabled for purposes of the ADA.
v. Keller Structures, Inc., 408 F.3d 390 (5/2005) Keller could not
accommodate a permanent disability with part-time employment for a few months, though it
went beyond what Pals required by putting Opsteen on six months' leave to see
whether improvement was likely, and not letting him go until it had medical opinions that
he would remain totally disabled after that period. Nor could Keller be expected to let
Opsteen work a few hours a day; part-time work is an accommodation suited to physical
weakness, and hours lengthen as strength returns. Mental shortcomings would have made
every hour on the job dangerous to Opsteen and his co-workers, so he has not suggested a
part-time job as an option.
v. Eau Galle Cheese Factory, 407 F.3d 852 (5/2005) an employer is entitled to
conclude that termination is warranted solely on the basis of the employee's patent
inability to perform his job in manner that meets the essential requirements of that
position. This is true even if, after further inquiry, an employer determines that the
employee's inability to perform the job "is due entirely to a disability." Matthews,
128 F.3d at 1195; see also Palmer, 117 F.3d at 352; Miller, 107 F.3d at
484-85. Either way, an employer is only in violation of the ADA if a terminated
employee can establish that reasonable accommodations exist that would have enabled that
person to perform the essential functions of his or her job. See Miller, 107
F.3d at 485-86. As demonstrated below, Hammel failed to put forth any such accommodations
and thus cannot prevail.
Julian Nordic Const. Co., 405 F.3d 638 (4/2005) There simply is no evidence
in this record that under this standard Nordic perceived Nese as disabled. In fact, Nese
was hired even though he told Julian that he could not drive at that time because he had
suffered a seizure. Also, as an aside, we will mention that the same person who hired Nese
is the one who fired him. In that situation, we have said that it is unlikely that
discrimination is involved. The conclusion is based on a common-sense psychological
assumption, that "[i]t hardly makes sense to hire workers from a group one dislikes
(thereby incurring the psychological costs of associating with them), only to fire them
once they are on the job."
University of Wisconsin Hosp. and Clinics Authority, 402 F.3d 768 (3/2005)
The district judge dismissed the suit on the hospital's motion, ruling that the hospital
is an arm of the State of Wisconsin and is therefore immune from suit in federal court
unless it has consented to be sued there, which it has not. Title I of the ADA does not
abrogate state sovereign immunity. In a case such as this, in which a privatized
"independent" entity for which the state bears no financial responsibility is
being sued over its personnel policies, which are entirely within its discretion, the fact
that the suit can have no adverse effect on the state's finances is highly relevant. The
grant of the motion to dismiss is REVERSED and the case REMANDED
v. City of Greenwood, 398 F.3d 609 (2/2005) None of Kupstas's attempts to
describe his perceived raking/shoveling impairment as more serious than it first appears
have created a triable issue. Kupstas has failed to present sufficient evidence from which
a reasonable jury could conclude that Greenwood regarded him as having an impairment that
rendered him unable to work in a class or broad range of jobs. At most, Kupstas can show
that Greenwood regarded him as unable to work in a specific job, the truck driver/laborer
position. This belief cannot be the basis of an ADA violation.
v. Potter, 394 F.3d 977 (1/2005) Mannie has failed to demonstrate that the
behavior of her co-workers and supervisors altered a term or condition of her employment.
In Silk, we held that a police officer who experienced direct verbal abuse and
threats of violence did not establish a hostile work environment because the
harassment did not materially alter the conditions of his employment. Id. at 808.
Mannie likewise has submitted no evidence that could establish that she experienced a
tangible employment action or that she was unable to perform her job because of the
conduct of her supervisors and co-workers. Mannie has not substantiated her claim that she
suffered an adverse employment action, and she has also failed to identify similarly
situated employees who did not file EEOC charges and were treated more favorably. Thus
summary judgment was appropriate under either method of proving retaliation.
v. Snow, 392 F.3d 896 (12/2004) On the record in this case, a reasonable
trier of fact could find that Mr. Branham is qualified for the position of criminal
investigator. Therefore, we must conclude that the IRS is not entitled to summary judgment
on the question of Mr. Branham's qualifications. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248
("summary judgment will not lie . . . if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party"). Mr. Branham has raised a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether he can perform the essential functions of the
position of criminal investigator without becoming a threat to the safety of himself or
others. On this record, the agency has not established otherwise. For the reasons
set forth in this opinion, the judgment of the district court is reversed and the case is
remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Mr. Branham may recover his costs
in this court. REVERSED and REMANDED
v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago, 390 F.3d 1032 (12/2004)
Even if Hunt-Golliday could prove that the District terminated her employment in 2002 for
discriminatory reasons, she would not be entitled to relief. Her termination was proper
because, although carried out in 2002, the decision to terminate was made and authorized
by the Civil Service Board in 1995. Extensive judicial review of that decision has
occurred, and it has been deemed legitimate. The district court's dismissal of this case
under Rule 12(b)(6) is AFFIRMED
v. Naperville School Dist. 203, 392 F.3d 236 (12/2004) Because the ADA's
enforcement provision expressly incorporates § 2000e-5 of Title VII, claims for
discrimination under the ADA also must be filed within 300 days "after the alleged
unlawful employment practice occurred." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1), incorporated
by 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a). Stepney has not demonstrated that he filed a timely EEOC
charge or that there is any genuine issue of material fact regarding accrual. Stepney's
EEOC charge, filed more than 600 days after the accrual of his claims, was untimely and
that untimeliness bars the present action.
Chippewa Falls School Dist., 388 F.3d 331 (11/2004) Cigan's line of argument
supposes that an employer offers accommodation only if it thinks that the employee
suffers from a substantial limitation in a major life activity. The "only if" is
vital; if employers accommodate for other reasons, then the fact of accommodation does not
support an inference that a given employer must have regarded a given employee as
disabled. Cigan does not try to justify the "only if" clause, and it would not
be a sound inference. Decent managers try to help employees cope with declining health
without knowing or caring whether they fit the definition in some federal statute.
Managers also may respond to state laws, local regulations, collective bargaining
agreements, and other norms that go beyond federal law. These may create legal
entitlements or practical expectations without implying anything about
"disability" under the ADA. Cigan offers no reason to conclude that the
principal at her school knew, supposed, or cared anything about the effect of her
conditions on "major life activities" when providing breaks, chairs, and other
assistance to continue teaching. Because the record would not permit a reasonable trier of
fact to conclude that the school district regarded Cigan as "disabled," we need
not decide whether the ADA requires an employer to accommodate the demands of a person who
is regarded as disabled but lacks an actual disability.
ex rel. Radaszewski v. Maram 383 F.3d 599 (9/2004) Eric's mother, Donna
Radaszewski, filed this suit against the Director of the IDPA (the "Director")
on Eric's behalf, contending that the IDPA's failure to fully fund athome, private-duty
nursing for Eric amounts to disability discrimination in violation of section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (the "Rehabilitation Act"), and
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (the
"ADA"), in that Illinois is refusing to provide the medical services that Eric
requires in order to remain in the most community-integrated setting appropriate for his
needs, which is his home. The district court entered judgment on the pleadings in favor of
the Director, reasoning that the ADA claim against the Director was barred by the Eleventh
Amendment and that the Rehabilitation Act claim failed as a matter of law because in-home
nursing care is not a service that Illinois currently provides to any adult individual. We
reverse and remand for further proceedings.
v. International Business Machines Corp., 370 F.3d 698 (6/2004) Plaintiff was
a new hire and the uncontradicted evidence, described at length in the district court's
opinion and unnecessary to repeat here, demonstrated that he failed to obtain an adequate
understanding of the product that he had been hired to sell (Lotus software) and as a
result was unable to convince prospective customers that the product was the answer to
their needs. He was especially poor at convincing them to buy the various ancillary
services that are an important part of the revenue of many software producers, including
IBM. His discharge had nothing to do with the expense incurred by IBM with respect to his
v. Aramark Uniform Services, Inc., 368 F.3d 809 (5/2004) We find no support,
and Ammons has offered none, for the conclusion that an interactive process must include
an employee's counsel or other persons including a rehabilitation counselor. Although
there may be cases where an attorney or a vocational expert would be of considerable
assistance in the interactive process, there is no requirement that an attorney and/or
vocational expert need to participate. The ADA envisions no more than "a flexible,
interactive process by which the employer and employee determine the appropriate
reasonable accommodation." Rehling v. City of Chicago, 207 F.3d 1009, 1015
(7th Cir. 2000). Such an interactive process occurred here. The undisputed facts establish
that Ammons was incapable of performing the essential functions of his job with or without
reasonable accommodations. Finally, we conclude that Aramark engaged in the required
interactive process. For these, and the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
v. Caterpillar, Inc., 368 F.3d 709 (5/2004) Shirley Hoffman, who is missing
her left arm below the elbow, brought this employment discrimination case under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. ("ADA").
Hoffman alleged that her employer, Caterpillar, Inc., engaged in unlawful disparate
treatment by refusing to train her to operate a high-speed document scanner. The case
proceeded to trial and on February 6, 2003, the jury returned a verdict for Caterpillar.
Hoffman now appeals, challenging myriad rulings, the jury instructions, and the denial of
Hoffman's motion to disqualify Judge McDade under 28 U.S.C. § 144. We affirm
Quad/Graphics, Inc., 366 F.3d 496, (4/2004) An employer's decision to punish
the instigator of a violent, or nearly-violent, episode more severely than it treats his
victim is evidence of rationality, not pretext. Buie has not rebutted Quad/Graphics'
nondiscriminatory reasons for first suspending and later discharging him. We affirm
summary judgment as to Buie's claim under the ADA because he fails to create an issue of
material fact under either the direct or indirect methods.
City of Lafayette 359 F.3d 925 (3/2004) Robert Foley alleges that the City of
Lafayette violated the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 by failing to provide adequate egress from the city-owned
train-station platform. The district court, relying on 49 C.F.R. § 37.161, concluded that
the inoperable elevators and snow-covered ramp that prevented Foley from an easy exit from
the platform were non-actionable isolated or temporary conditions as a matter of law.
Because we agree with the district court's conclusion, we affirm the grant of summary
judgment to the City of Lafayette.
v. Banc of America Securities, LLC, 355 F.3d 961 (1/ 2004) Colleen Kramer
sued her former employer, Banc of America Securities, LLC ("BOA"), for, among
other things, retaliatory discharge in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act,
42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (the "ADA"). After a bench trial, the
district court found in favor of BOA. On appeal we must determine whether compensatory and
punitive damages are available as a remedy for a retaliation claim against an employer
under the ADA. We affirm the district court's decision to deny consideration of
compensatory and punitive damages, and its decision to conduct the trial in this case
without a jury.
v. Recording Industry Ass'n of America, 354 F.3d 632 (1/2004) the district
court granted RIAA's motion to dismiss as to all counts and entered judgment in RIAA's
favor. The district court held the discriminatory discharge claims (Counts I and III) were
time-barred, and the retaliation claims (Counts II and IV) were not actionable because
retaliation connected to an independent contractor relationship does not have the
requisite nexus to an employment relationship. Mr. Flannery timely appealed both of these
holdings. Because we are in respectful disagreement with the determinations of the
district court, we must reverse its judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.
v. Air-Land Transport Services, Inc., 343 F.3d 895 (9/2003) Allowing this
suit to go forward would merely discourage employers from giving a chance for employment
to workers who have some degree of disability. Loading and driving a flatbed truck is
strenuous work, and so a partially disabled person would be bound to have an above-average
probability of failing at it. If the probability materializes, as it may or may not have
done in this case (remember that we don't know which hand Tockes used in fastening the
load), and the company blames both itself and the partial disability for the failure,
there is no reason to ascribe a discriminatory motive to the employer.
Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center, 338 F.3d 736 (8/2003) In
sum, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to reduce
the attorney's fees award based on the rejection of a settlement offer early in the
litigation, nor do we find an abuse of discretion in awarding of prejudgment interest. As
to these two issues, the ruling of the district court is AFFIRMED. We, however, also
conclude that Shott should not receive attorney's fees and costs for the first trial,
although she may be compensated for work done in preparation for that trial. The district
court's grant of attorney's fees for the first trial is REVERSED
Garvey, 334 F.3d 590 (6/2003) Viewed in the light most favorable to
Dyrek, there is no evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude the FAA's
proffered reason for Dyrek;s termination was pretextual. The district court's grant of
summary judgment is AFFIRMED.
Avon Products, Inc., 328 F.3d 379 (5/2003) Time off may be an apt
accommodation for intermittent conditions. Someone with arthritis or lupus may be able to
do a given job even if, for brief periods, the inflammation is so painful that the person
must stay home. See Haschmann v. Time Warner Entertainment Co., 151 F.3d 591 (7th Cir.
1998). Cf. Pals v. Schepel Buick & GMC Truck, Inc., 220 F.3d 495, 498 (7th Cir. 2000)
(part-time work may accommodate a person recovering from a medical problem). But Byrne did
not want a few days off or a part-time position; his only proposed accommodation is not
working for an extended time, which as far as the ADA is concerned confesses that he was
not a "qualified individual" in late 1998. "The rather common-sense idea is
that if one is not able to be at work, one cannot be a qualified individual."
Waggoner v. Olin Corp., 169 F.3d 481, 482 (7th Cir. 1999). Spotty attendance by itself may
show lack of qualification. See EEOC v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 253 F.3d 943 (7th
Cir. 2001) (en banc). Inability to work for a multi-month period removes a person from the
class protected by the ADA.
O'Neal Steel, Inc. 327 F.3d 628, (5/2003) Dyke has presented no evidence to
show he would have been able to pass O'Neal's vision test, and O'Neal's expert reported
that an individual needs vision in both eyes to meet O'Neal's vision standards. Because
Dyke's monocular vision prevents him from meeting O'Neal's vision standards, we need not
address the effects of his NRSD. Dyke cannot show he was able to perform the essential
functions of the temporary position, and Judge Cosbey appropriately granted O'Neal's
motion for summary judgment on this claim. The grant of summary judgment in favor of
O'Neal is AFFIRMED.
Good Shepherd Manor Foundation, Inc. v. City of Momence, 323 F.3d 557, (5/2003)
U.S. Tobacco Mfg. Ltd. Partnership, 319 F.3d 891, (2/2003) This case
involves Beverly Rauen's claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA")
that her employer, United States Tobacco ("UST"), discriminated against her by
failing to provide a reasonable accommodation for her disability. The district court
granted UST's summary judgment motion, holding that Rauen was not entitled to an
accommodation because, although she was disabled, she could perform the essential
functions of her job without any accommodation. For the reasons set forth in the following
opinion, we affirm the district court's decision.
v. City of Mauston, 311 F.3d 835 (11/2002) Assuming, solely for the
purpose of summary judgment, that the City regarded Peters as disabled, the district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the City. Specifically, the court found that Peters'
requested accommodation was unreasonable because it eliminated an essential function of
his job as an Operator. Peters appeals the district court's determination that heavy
lifting was an essential function of his job as well as the district court's finding that
his proposed accommodation was unreasonable. We affirm.
Mack v. Great
Dane Trailers, 308 F.3d 776 (10/2002) We agree with Great Dane that, on
the ADA claim, there was insufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably find
that Great Dane regarded Mack as substantially limited in any major life activity and that
the district court erred in denying Great Dane's motion for judgment as a matter of law.
Ogborn v. United
Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local No. 881, 305 F.3d 763 (9/2002) merely
having an impairment, such as depression, does not make an individual disabled under the
statute. A claimant must also demonstrate that the im-pairment limits a major life
activityin Ogborn's case the activity of working. See 42 U.S.C. §
12102(2)(A); Toyota Mfg., 122 S. Ct. at 690; Sutton v. United Air Lines,Nos.
00-3779 & 01-1546 7 Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482-83 (1999). Here Ogborn has not
identified any evidence that depression limited his ability to work before his suspension
and subsequent visit to Dr. Clark in August 1997; indeed, Ogborn testified at his
deposition that when he went to see Dr. Clark he thought that he could still perform his
job. Likewise, he has failed to point to any evidence that he could not work after October
23, when he certified that he could work. Ogborn responds that even if his
depression did not amount to an actual disability, the ADA still protects him because he
was "regarded as" having a disability by officials at Local 881. See 42
U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C); Dvorak v. Mostardi Platt Assocs., Inc., 289 F.3d 479, 483-84
(7th Cir. 2002). That contention is also unpersuasive, however, because Ogborn has not
presented evidence that union personnel held exaggerated views about the seriousness of
Lithonia Lighting, 304 F.3d 749 (9/2002) We conclude that the ADA does
not require an employer that sets aside a pool of positions for recovering employees to
make those positions available indefinitely to an employee whose recovery has run its
course without re-storing that worker to her original healthy state. A person is
"otherwise qualified" within the meaning of the ADA only if she can perform one
of the regular jobs (with or without an accommodation). Watson cannot perform any
assembly-line job at Lithonia; what she wants is a different job, comprising a subset of
the assemblyline tasks, rather than an accommodation in the performance of one of
Lithonia's existing assembly-line jobs (all of which entail all tasks). Because the ADA
does not require employers to create new positions, the judgment of the district court is
Principi, 301 F.3d 866 (9/2002) the VA did accommodate the plaintiff's
disability, and the accommodation was reasonable. The clerical position to which it
reassigned her gave her the same net after-tax salary as she had earned as a nurse though
with fewer fringe benefits and, because it did not draw on her nursing skills, fewer
career advantages. It was not a perfect substitute. But an employer is not required to
provide the accommodation for a disabled employee that is ideal from the employee's
standpoint, only one that is reasonable in terms of costs and benefits. See Oconomowoc
Residential Programs, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 2002 WL 1811325, at *7-8 (7th Cir. Aug.
8, 2002); Hoffman v. Caterpillar, Inc., 256 F.3d 568, 577 (7th Cir. 2001); Vande Zande v.
Wisconsin Dept. of Administration, 44 F.3d 538, 542-43 (7th Cir. 1995); Reed v. LePage
Bakeries, Inc., 244 F.3d 254, 259-60 (1st Cir. 2001); Gaul v. Lucent Technologies, Inc.,
134 F.3d 576, 580-81 (3d Cir. 1998); Monette v. Electronic Data Systems Corp., 90 F.3d
1173, 1183 and n. 10 (6th Cir. 1996); Borkowski v. Valley Central School District, 63 F.3d
131, 138 (2d Cir. 1995).
Residential Programs v. City of Milwaukee, 300 F.3d 775 (8/2002) After the City of Milwaukee (City) denied Oconomowoc
Residential Programs, Inc. (ORP) a zoning variance to operate a community living facility
in the City, ORP sued the City for violations of the Fair Housing Amendments Act (FHAA)
and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court granted Oconomowoc's and
plaintiff-intervenors' motion for partial summary judgment and denied the City's motion
for summary judgment. The City appeals, and we affirm.
O'Neal v. City
of New Albany, 293 F.3d 998 (6/2002) Kenneth
O'Neal sued the City of New Albany, Indiana, its police merit commission, and the local
police pension board for racial discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, and for violating
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d). The magistrate judge,
handling the case with the parties' consent, granted summary judgment for the de-fendants
on all counts. We affirm the judgment with respect to O'Neal's ADA claim, but because
O'Neal is entitled to a trial on his race discrimination claims, we vacate in part and
remand the case to the district court for further pro-ceedings.
v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 291 F.3d 955 (5/2002) The plaintiff
brought suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act and is appealing from the grant of
judgment as a matter of law to the defendant, his former employer, after a jury rendered a
verdict for the plaintiff. The plaintiff has an unpleasant physical ailment known as
congenital nystagmus, which makes it difficult for him to focus his eyes. The condition
prevents him from holding a job in which he has to spend more than 50percent of his time
reading. A long- term employee of AT&T, he several years ago applied for a job in the
company that required him to read a computer screen for at least 80 percent of the
workday. This was too much for him. He contends, and for purposes of the appeal we accept,
that the company made no effort to accommodate his condition by giving him a job that
would require less reading. And the Act does impose a duty of accommodation. But he has
put the cart before the horse. The duty of accommodation arises only if the employee is
determined to have a disability within the meaning of the Act, e.g., Hoffman v.
Caterpillar, Inc., 256 F.3d 568, 572 (7th Cir. 2001); Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers,
Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 563 (7th Cir. 1996); Gelabert-Ladenheim v. American Airlines, Inc., 252
F.3d 54, 59 and n. 5 (1st Cir. 2001); Swain v. Hillsborough County School Board, 146 F.3d
855, 858 (11th Cir. 1998), and we agree with the district judge that no jury could
reasonably find that the plaintiff did have such a disability.
v. Mostardi Platt Associates, Inc., 289 F.3d 479 (5/2002) Kevin Dvorak
was employed by Mostardi Platt Associates, Inc. (Mostardi-Platt) from 1989 until the
spring of 1997. Throughout those years, he suffered from arthritis. Dvorak's arthritic
pains would come in flare-ups; there were periods during which he was able to function
quite well, and other times when his mobility was significantly restricted. In 1997,
during one of the flare-ups, Dvorak missed work for a substantial number of days. Shortly
thereafter, he was terminated. Believing that he lost his job because of his physical
disability, he filed suit against Mostardi-Platt, alleging that he had been terminated in
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. sec. 12101 et seq. The
district court entered summary judgment in favor of Mostardi-Platt. Although it found that
Dvorak was an individual with a disability as defined by 42 U.S.C. sec. 12102(2) and that
genuine issues of fact existed as to whether he was qualified to perform his job with or
without a reasonable accommodation, it concluded that he was terminated for reasons
unrelated to his disability, and therefore had no claim under the ADA. We affirm.
v. Holsum of Fort Wayne, Inc., 278 F.3d 706 (1/2002) Rebecca Lewis
filed a pro se complaint in the District Court for the Northern District of Indiana
alleging that Holsum of Fort Wayne, Inc., discriminated against her on the basis of her
race, disability, and sex and that she was terminated from her employment with Holsum in
retaliation for filing a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") in violation of both the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. 12201 et seq., and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The district court granted Lewis leave to amend her complaint. Lewis added an additional
theory of recovery asserting that she was denied medical leave and terminated in violation
of the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. sec. 2601 et seq. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of Holsum. Lewis now appeals. Because
this court finds that the district court correctly entered summary judgment in favor of
Holsum, we affirm.
v. CPC Intern, 277 F.3d 896 (1/2002) Ralph Nawrot sued his former
employer, CPC International ("Bestfoods"), claiming that Bestfoods failed to
accommodate reasonably his disability and discriminated against him because of his
disability during his employment, and that his discharge was the product of age and
disability discrimination and retaliation for seeking accommodation. In granting summary
judgment to Bestfoods, the district court held that Nawrot could not show that he was a
qualified individual with a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA") and that he had failed to show that Bestfoods' proffered legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for his termination were a pretext for discrimination. Nawrot
asks us to reverse the decision of the district court. We do so in part. We affirm on
pretext, but reverse on disability, finding that Nawrot has sufficiently demonstrated that
he is a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA. We remand for the district
court to resolve whatever remains of Nawrot's reasonable accommodation and
disability-based discrimination claims in light of our decision.
v. Chicago Park Dist., 270 F.3d 532 (11/2001) This is a suit under the
Americans with Disabilities Act charging that the plaintiff's employer failed to
accommodate his disability. After a bench trial, the district judge found that the
plaintiff was physically inca-pable of working full time, even with an accommodation, and
therefore was not within the Act's protections. We think the judge was right, and that in
any event the plaintiff's claim is barred by the doctrine of estoppel.
v. SVI Systems, Inc., 270 F.3d 445 (10/2001) Plaintiff, Kent Furnish,
brought a suit against his ex- employer, alleging violations of the Americans with
Disabilities Act ("ADA"). 42 U.S.C. sec. 12101. Defendant, SVI Systems,
terminated plaintiff's employment on July 25, 1996, for the stated reason of
"unsatisfactory work performance." Plaintiff alleges that he was terminated
because he suffered from cirrhosis caused by chronic Hepatitis B. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of defendant on the grounds that plaintiff failed to
show that he was disabled under the ADA. We agree with the district court's conclusion
that plaintiff was not disabled, and therefore affirm.
v. Joint Admin. Bd., Retirement Plan of Pillsbury Co. and American federation of Grain
Millers, AFL-CIO-CLC, 268 F.3d 456 (10/2001)
v. Delco Electronics Corp., 263 F.3d 663 (8/2001) The ADA defines
disability as the impairment of a major life activity, such as walking, seeing, and
reproduction. 42 U.S.C. sec. 12102(2)(A); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638-39 (1998);
Amadio v. Ford Motor Co., 238 F.3d 919, 925 (7th Cir. 2001). Frazier does not have a
disability in that sense. She is perfectly healthy. She can do anything that any normal
person can do--except work in proximity to Bester Spears. Working in proximity to Bester
Spears is not a major life activity.
v. Village of Wilmette, 269 F.3d 831 (10/2001) the Village argues that
the Dadians failed to prove that: 1) they were disabled, 2) the Village did notreasonably
accommodate their disabilities, and 3) the Village intentionally discriminated against
them because of their disabilities. The Village also contends that the jury instructions
improperly placed the burden of proof on the Village as to whether Mrs. Dadian posed a
direct threat to the safety of others, and that various evidentiary rulings at trial were
improper. We address and reject each argument in turn
v. City of Salem, Ind., 259 F.3d 667 (8/2001) After Jimmy Dale Lee
suffered a back injury that left him unable to perform heavy physical labor, the City of
Salem, Indiana ("Salem" or the "city") discharged him from his
position as sexton of the city's cemetery. Lee sued the city pursuant to the Americans
with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. sec. 12101, contending that he remained
able to perform his work with or without accommodation. A jury found in his favor and
awarded him damages. In the interim between his discharge and the trial, however, Lee had
sought and obtained disability benefits, asserting in his application that he was unable
to perform his past work as a sexton. When queried about the discrepancy at trial, Lee
explained that although he was, in fact, able to perform his work, he had applied for
benefits and claimed an inability to work because his disability had been "hammered
into [his] head" and "[he] believed that was the only thing to do, sign up for
disability." R. 126 at 64-65. As a matter of law, we find that explanation insuffi
cient to satisfy the criteria established by Cleveland v. Policy Mgmnt. Sys. Corp., 526
U.S. 795, 119 S. Ct. 1597 (1999), and Feldman v. American Mem. Life Ins. Co., 196 F.3d 783
(7th Cir. 1999), and therefore reverse the judgment entered in Lee's favor.
v. City of Chicago, 259 F.3d 610 (7/2001)
v. City of Attica, Indiana, 259 F.3d 619 (7/2001) Clyde Pugh brought an
ADA discrimination claim and a retaliatory discharge claim under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983
against the City of Attica, Indiana, and the Attica Board of Works (collectively "the
City")./1 The City filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court granted
judgment to the City. The court held that Mr. Pugh failed to demonstrate that the City's
proffered reason for his discharge was a pretext, as required to succeed on the ADA claim.
The court also rejected Mr. Pugh's Section 1983 retaliatory discharge claim because he did
not establish the requisite causal connection between his protected First Amendment
activity and his termination. Mr. Pugh now appeals the district court's judgment on both
claims. For the reasons set forth in the following opinion, we affirm the judgment of the
v. Caterpiller, Inc., 256 F.3d 568 (7/2001) Shirley Hoffman, who was
born without a left arm below the elbow, brought suit alleging that Caterpillar, Inc.
unlawfully discriminated against her by failing to provide training on two machines in
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. sec. 12101 et seq./1
Hoffman alleged both disparate treatment and failure to accommodate claims with respect to
the first machine, the high speed scanner, while she only alleged disparate treatment with
respect to the second, the main console. Caterpillar moved for summary judgment and the
district court granted the motion. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm in part but
vacate the district court's grant of summary judgment for Caterpillar on Hoffman's
disparate treatment claim with respect to the high-speed scanner.
v. Northern States Power Co., 256 F.3d 506 (6/2001) Loretta Emerson/1 sued
her former employer, Northern States Power Company ("NSP") for firing her in
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") 42 U.S.C. sec. 12101 et
seq. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of NSP on the ground that
Emerson was not a qualified individual. We affirm.
v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 253 F.3d 943 (6/2001) On May 4, 1998,
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed a single count complaint in the
Northern District of Illinois against the Defendant-Appellee Yellow Freight System, Inc.,
alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act based on Michael Nicosia's, an
employee of Yellow Freight, HIV/AIDS disability./1 Specifically, the EEOC alleged that
Yellow Freight terminated Nicosia because of his AIDS related cancer and in retaliation
for Nicosia's filing of a complaint with the EEOC. Upon the defendant's motion, the
district court granted summary judgment in favor of Yellow Freight. We affirm.
v. United Ins. Co. of America, 253 F.3d 280 (6/2001) The burden that
would be placed on employers if disabled persons could demand special training to fit them
for new jobs would be excessive and is not envisaged or required by the Act. The duty of
reasonable accommodation may require the employer to reconfigure the workplace to enable a
disabled worker to cope with her disability, but it does not require the employer to
reconfigure the disabled worker
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 250 F.3d 1109 (5/2001) James Kersting sued
his current employer, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., alleging that Wal-Mart violated the Americans
with Disabilities Act ("ADA") by discriminating against him because of his
disability, and then by retaliating against him for complaining about such discrimination.
Wal-Mart moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion, concluding
that Kersting failed to show that he suffered a materially adverse employment action.
Kersting appeals. We affirm.
v. Memorial Hosp. of South Bend, Inc., 249 F.3d 682 (5/2001) Dr. Thomas
Mattice worked for Memorial Hospital in South Bend, Indiana as an anesthesiologist until
he went on leave for depression and panic disorder. Mattice claims that after he returned
to work, Memorial discriminated against him based on his disability, and he sued under the
ADA. The district court dismissed his complaint for failure to state a claim. Mattice
appeals. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
v. Ispat Inland Inc., 245 F.3d 969 (4/2001)
v. CSX Transp., Inc., 245 F.3d 916 (3/2001) John Lawson, Sr. filed a
claim against CSX Transportation, Inc. ("CSX") under the Americans With
Disabilities Act ("ADA" or "the Act"). He alleged that CSX had
discriminated against him because of a disability when it refused to hire him as a trainee
for a train conductor position. The district court held that Mr. Lawson had presented
insufficient evidence for a jury to find that his Type I insulin-dependent diabetes
constituted a disability within ADA coverage, or that CSX refused to hire him because of
his disability. Because we believe that the district court did not analyze properly
whether Mr. Lawson is entitled to the protections of the Act and therefore failed to
assess properly the evidence of record, we must reverse the judgment of the district court
and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
v. Rockwell Intern. Corp., 243 F.3d 1012 (3/2001)
v. Cook County, 241 F.3d 919 (3/2001) . Abuzaffer Basith sued Cook
County, his employer, for discriminating against him in violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. sec. 12112(a), and for retaliation in
violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e. The district court granted summary judgment
for Cook County on both claims. Basith appeals. We affirm.
v. Ford Motor Co., 238 F.3d 919 (2/2001) Thomas Amadio was an hourly
employee on the assembly line at Ford Motor Company's Chicago Assembly Plant from June 9,
1986, to March 8, 1995, the date of his termination by Ford Motor Company (Ford). In the
three years prior to his termination, Amadio suffered from a variety of ailments that led
him to take a total of approximately 70 weeks of sick leave. Because Amadio allegedly
failed to fully comply with Ford's sick leave policy, Ford terminated Amadio's employment.
Following his termination, Amadio filed this suit against Ford under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. sec.sec. 12101-12213, claiming that Ford discriminated
against him because of his disability or, in the alternative, because it regarded him as
having a disability. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Ford. We
v. Henderson, 237 F.3d 837 (1/2001) Arthur Ozlowski sued his former
employer, William Henderson, the Postmaster General of the United States, alleging that
the United States Postal Service had failed to accommodate his disabilities in violation
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. sec. 791, et seq. The Postal Service filed a
motion for summary judgment and Ozlowski filed a cross- motion for partial summary
judgment. The district court granted the Postal Service's motion and denied Ozlowski's
cross-motion. Ozlowski appealed to this court, and we affirm.
v. City of Chicago, 237 F.3d 783 (1/2001) Whether or not his alleged
disability of drug addiction created a wholly involuntary need to possess drugs, Pernice
made a conscious choice to actually possess drugs. We therefore have little trouble
separating his misconduct from his alleged disability. The City may punish Pernice for the
former without violating any legal protections he may possess because of the latter.
v. Suncast Corp., 23 F.3d 756 (1/2001) Antonio Contreras was injured in
a forklift accident while employed by Suncast. After repeated violations of Suncast's
safety protocols, work attendance policies, and acts of insubordination, Contreras was
dismissed by the company. Contreras thereafter filed suit alleging a multitude of claims,
primarily revolving around the assertion that Suncast had discriminated against him in
violation of both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Americans with
Disabilities Act ("ADA"). The district court granted Suncast summary judgment on
all of Contreras's claims, denied Contreras's cross-motion for partial summary judgment
and dismissed Contreras's remaining state law claims. The court also awarded Suncast a
partial bill of costs. Contreras now appeals both the summary judgment determinations as
well as the award of costs. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.
v. Intermet Wagner Inc., 233 F.3d 1014 (12/2000) Jack Jay worked for
Intermet Wagner, Inc. as a millwright, repairing and maintaining equipment, most of which
was accessible only by climbing ladders and stairs. In 1992, Jay tore his Achilles tendon,
an injury that, according to his treating physicians, permanently precluded him from jobs
involving climbing. When Jay requested to be reinstated as a millwright, Wagner refused.
Rather, Wagner placed Jay on extended medical layoff until an appropriate position became
available 20 months later. Jay sued Wagner under the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA"). The district court granted summary judgment to Wagner because it found
that Wagner reasonably accommodated Jay. We affirm.
v. Henderson, 233 F.3d 521 (11/2000) Hansen, a mail carrier
working out of the Glenview, Illinois post office, sued the Postal Service for failure to
accommodate his disability, in violation of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. sec.sec. 701
et seq. A bench trial resulted in a judgment for the defendant. Having
credited Slickenmeyer's testimony that there were no vacancies in jobs that Hansen could
perform, the district judge could not have gone on to find that Hansen had rebutted this
testimony by inventing a job that he could have performed for the Postal Service. That is
not proper rebuttal. The judgment in favor of the defendant must therefore be Affirmed.
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 233 F.3d 432 (11/2000) The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") filed suit under the Americans with
Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. sec. 12101 et seq., alleging that Sears,
Roebuck & Co. ("Sears"), engaged in unlawful employment discrimination
against Judith Keane. The court granted leave to Keane to intervene in this matter and
file an amended complaint. In addition to the EEOC's claim that Sears failed to reasonably
accommodate Keane's disability, Keane asserts in her complaint that she has been
constructively discharged from her job with Sears. The district court granted summary
judgment for Sears on both claims, based largely on its determination that Keane was not
considered disabled under the terms of the ADA. We Affirm the district court's grant
of summary judgment to the defendant on plaintiff's and intervenor's claim for
constructive discharge; we Reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor
of the defendant on plaintiff's and intervenor's claim for failure to reasonably
accommodate a disability under the ADA; and we Remand this case to the district court for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
v. Martin Marietta Materials, Inc., 231 F.3d 396 (10/2000) Arlie
Leonberger suffers from sleep apnea, a serious disorder that causes a person to stop
breathing for brief periods of time while asleep; the oxygen deprivation that results
disrupts the person's normal sleep cycle, leaving the individual very tired and with a
tendency to fall asleep during the day. Beginning in 1967, Leonberger had a job working in
a rock quarry that was eventually owned by the defendant, Martin Marietta Materials, Inc.
(Martin). Martin became concerned about Leonberger's tendency to "nod off" on
the job after it received complaints to that effect. After efforts to obtain medical
treatment failed (for reasons we detail below), Martin fired him. Leonberger sued under
the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. sec.sec. 12101 et seq.,
but the district court granted summary judgment for Martin. We agree that Leonberger has
not pointed to any triable issue of fact and is not entitled to judgment. We therefore
v. Clyde L. Choate Mental Health and Development Center, 230 F.3d 991 (10/2000) Jeffrey
Webb appeals from the district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Clyde L.
Choate Mental Health and Development Center ("Choate"), on cross motions, on his
claim that Choate failed to reasonably accommodate his disability and terminated his
employment in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42
U.S.C. sec. 12101 et seq. Webb contends that the district court erred in finding that he
was not a "qualified individual with a disability" within the meaning of the
ADA, that he was provided with reasonable accommodations to perform the essential
functions of his job, and that he was not discharged because of his disability. On appeal,
Choate disputes our jurisdiction over this appeal. For the reasons set forth below, we
find that we have jurisdiction over this appeal, and affirm the district court's grant of
summary judgment for Choate.
v. Humana Health Plan, Inc., 229 F.3d 662 (9/2000) Dr. Stephanie Bekker
worked as a physician for Humana Health Plan, Inc. ("Humana") until Humana
discharged her because it had received numerous reports that Dr. Bekker had smelled of
alcohol and had exhibited other signs of alcohol use when seeing her patients. After her
discharge, Dr. Bekker filed this action against Humana; she alleged that Humana
discriminated against her on account of her perceived disability of alcoholism in
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. sec. 12101
et seq. The district court granted summary judgment for Humana. For the reasons set forth
in the following opinion, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024 (2000) There is enough doubt
on this record about the superiority of the office jobs for which Houser applies to make
us prefer to rest decision on the alternative ground that the ADA does not require an
employer to reassign a disabled employee to a job for which there is a better applicant,
provided it's the employer's consistent and honest policy to hire the best applicant for
the particular job in question rather than the first qualified applicant.
v. Board of Com'rs of Madison County, 226 F.3d 558 (2000) McPhaul
presents no medical evidence to show that her performance deficiencies at either job were
due to her alleged disability of fibromyalgia.
v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., 221 F.3d 944 (2000) From the evidence
Hunt had in its possession at the time of Mr. Moore's termination, the assessment of Dr.
Hamilton and the NIOSH test results, Hunt "had no reason to regard [Mr. Moore] as
disabled and gave no indication that it did." Harrington, 122 F.3d at 461. In light
of Mr. Moore's inability to tolerate cold, damp conditions, Hunt simply determined that
Mr. Moore could no longer perform the range instructor position. Because Hunt did not
perceive Mr. Moore as precluded from a wide range of jobs, but only that of range
instructor, Mr. Moore is not disabled for purposes of the ADA.
v. Schepel Buick & GMC Truck, Inc., 220 F.3d 495 (2000)
v. Village of Bedford Park, 215 F.3d 703 (2000) He claimed that his
employer, the Village of Bedford Park (the "Village"), had discriminated against
him on the basis of his disability; Mr. Conley is a recovering alcoholic. The district
court granted summary judgment for the Village. For the reasons set forth in the following
opinion, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
v. United Airlines, Inc., 213 F.3d 365 (2000) Punitive damages depend
not on the egregiousness of the defendant's misconduct, or its callousness in denying
reasonable accommodation, but instead run from a culpable state of mind regarding whether
that denial of accommodation violates federal law. See Kolstad, 119 S.Ct. at 2124; see
also Deters v. Equifax Credit Info. Servs., 202 F.3d 1262, 1269 (10th Cir. 2000). United's
failure to accommodate Gile's disability amounted to negligence because it misunderstood
Gile's difficulties, did not regard her condition a disability and neglected to pursue
Gile in developing an alternative accommodation. Although United wrongly believed that
Gile was not disabled under the ADA and did not adequately address her accommodation
request, United did not exhibit the requisite reckless state of mind regarding whether its
treatment of Gile violated the ADA. The district court should have granted United's motion
for judgment as a matter of law regarding punitive damages, and we will reverse the award
of punitive damages, leaving Gile with a judgment for $200,000 in compensatory damages.
v. Snyder, 213 F.3d 344 (2000) In the wake of Kimel v. Florida Board of
Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000), we have held that sec.5 does not afford Congress the
authority to enact Title I of the ADA. Erickson v. Board of Governors for Northeastern
Illinois University, 207 F.3d 945 (7th Cir. 2000); Stevens v. Illinois Department of
Transportation, No. 98-3550 (7th Cir. Apr. 11, 2000). Our opinion in Erickson reserved
questions concerning other titles of the ADA, which potentially have different scope. But
Walker's claim falls squarely within both Erickson's and Stevens's reasoning, for those
cases concluded that Title I of the ADA cannot be based on sec.5 to the extent that it
requires accommodation of disabilities (rather than simply requiring the state to
disregard disabilities) and to the extent that it forbids a state to take account of
disabilities that are rationally related to permissible objects of public action. Walker
wants Illinois to accommodate rather than ignore his disability.
v. Cassens Transport Co., 212 F.3d 969 (2000) Bay alleges that the
district court erred in concluding that he was required to exhaust his administrative
remedies before pursuing judicial relief. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the
decision of the district court.
v. Hayes Wheels Intern.-Indiana, Inc., 211 F.3d 392 (2000) Because
Spath has failed to present any evidence of discriminatory intent, we hold that he has
failed to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination.
v. Methodist Hosp., 210 F.3d 792 (2000) Stephen Lenker sued his
employer, Methodist Hospital, under the Americans With Disabilities Act, for failing to
accommodate him. Lenker, a nurse, suffered from multiple sclerosis ("MS"). After
his doctor issued a lifting restriction for him, the hospital removed him from his job as
a nurse because the hospital considered lifting to be an essential part of the job that
could not be reasonably accommodated. A jury found in favor of the hospital and Lenker
appeals. We affirm.
v. Illinois Dept. of Trans., 210 F.3d 732 (2000) Passage of the ADA was not a
proper exercise of Congress's authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Therefore, the ADA does not abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity, and IDOT, as
a department of the State of Illinois, cannot be sued without its consent in federal court
for a violation of the ADA. We conclude that the district court did not have subject
matter jurisdiction to hear this case. We Vacate the district court's entry of judgment in
favor of the defendant and Dismiss this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
v. Midwest Property Management Ltd. Partnership, 209 F.3d 678 (2000) Staceen
Sinkler suffers from a "specific phobia" involving the operation of an
automobile. Her condition makes her unable to drive anywhere unfamiliar to her, and on at
least two occasions, her phobia forced her employer, Midwest Property Management Limited
Partnership ("Midwest"), to make alternate travel arrangements so she could
perform her job as regional sales manager. Midwest ultimately discharged Sinkler. Sinkler
filed suit against Midwest, alleging that Midwest discharged her because of her phobia and
failed to make reasonable accommodations for her condition, in violation of the Americans
with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). Midwest moved for summary judgment, arguing that
Sinkler was not a qualified individual with a disability within the meaning of the ADA
because Sinkler's specific phobia did not substantially limit her major life activity of
working. The district court granted Midwest's motion. Sinkler appeals, and we affirm.
v. City of Chicago, 207 F.3d 1009 (2000) We hold that the district
court properly granted partial summary judgment to the City on Rehling's reasonable
accommodation claim, and that the district court did not commit an abuse of discretion by
admitting evidence of the position in the Alternative Response Unit at the trial on
disparate treatment. In addition, we hold that the district court's exclusion of evidence
based on the attorney-client privilege was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we AFFIRM
the decision of the district court.
v. City of Chicago, 203 F.3d 507 (2000) For the reasons stated above,
we Affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Defendants on the issue of
whether CPD regarded Krocka as disabled. We also Affirm the district court's denial of
Krocka's request for a new trial, the district court's dismissal of Krocka's state law
IIED claim, and the district court's denial of Krocka's request for attorney's fees.
v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 204 F.3d 727 (2000) Because Mr.
Wright has failed to demonstrate that the Department regarded him as being substantially
impaired in a major life activity,/4 he has not shown that he is disabled as defined in
the ADA and cannot establish this prerequisite for claiming disability discrimination
under the ADA. We therefore must affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to
v. Espo. Engineering Corp., 200 F.3d 1081 (2000)
v. In-Sink-Erator Div. of Emerson Elec. Co., 201 F.3d 894 (2000) The
record before us supports the trial court's conclusion that regular and timely attendance
is an essential function of the tool and die maker position at ISE. It also supports the
court's conclusion that Jovanovic could not perform that function of his job. Further,
because there is no evidence that Jovanovic ever requested an accommodation, nor that any
reasonable accommodation would have enabled him to perform his job, the district court's
conclusion that Jovanovic is not a qualified individual with a disability was not in
error. Therefore, the trial judge's grant of summary judgment to ISE on Jovanovic's ADA
claims was proper.
v. Fortis Ins. Co., 200 F.3d 1055 (2000) After her discharge, Susan A.
Schneiker filed this action against her former employer, Fortis Insurance Company
("Fortis"), for violating the Americans with Disabilities Act (the
"ADA"). In her complaint, Ms. Schneiker alleged that Fortis failed to
accommodate her alcoholism and severe depression and discharged her because of these
impairments. The district court granted summary judgment for Fortis; Ms. Schneiker now
appeals. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the district
Cable v. Ivy Tech State College, 200 F.3d 467 (1999)
Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557 (1999)
v. National Steel Corp., Midwest Div., 197 F.3d 894 (1999) We hold that
the district court's grant of summary judgment to National was proper. Green's failure to
accommodate claim is barred because she omitted any mention of it from her EEOC complaint,
and her disparate treatment claim fails because nothing in the record is sufficient to
demonstrate that National did not honestly believe that Green had manipulated her
v. Wisconsin Dept. of Transp., 197 F.3d 292 (1999) Therefore, the
transfer to a position that did not involve the same opportunities for advancement was not
a reasonable accommodation. Moreover, the training that was provided was not sufficiently
designed to address the needs posed by Vollmert's disability. The Department was aware of
Vollmert's dyslexia and learning disabilities since at least August 1994, and was
specifically made aware of the need for specialized training by Dr. Woodard's letter in
early 1995. Moreover, Vollmert explicitly requested a tutor trained in learning
disabilities in April 1995, and Schutz indicated that such a trainer likely was available
free of charge through the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation. The Department
nevertheless failed to provide training geared toward her disability throughout that time.
The Department may have been well-meaning in its efforts, but its attempts to accommodate
her were not reasonable because they were not tailored to address the problems posed by
v. Corville, Inc., 196 F.3d 879 (1999) Corvilla moved for summary
judgment, arguing that Gorbitz failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination
because she did not establish that she had a disability as defined by the ADA. Gorbitz
asserted that Corvilla management perceived her as disabled because they knew that she was
being seen by various doctors. The district court found that Gorbitz established a prima
facie case of discrimination under the ADA, but concluded that she failed to establish
Corvilla's reasons for terminating her was pretextual. Accordingly, the court granted
summary judgment in favor of Corvilla. We affirm.
v. American Memorial Life Ins. Co., 196 F.3d 783 (1999) To avoid summary
judgment under Cleveland, a plaintiff must resolve the apparent inconsistency with an
explanation which warrants a reasonable juror's conclusion that the plaintiff could
perform the essential functions of her job, with or without reasonable accommodation, even
assuming the truth of the earlier statement. Cleveland, 119 S.Ct. at 1604. Although we
have already explained that contradictions between SSDI and ADA attestations might be
explicable, and thus a plaintiff is entitled to account for such inconsistencies, we will
not assume that such a contradiction can be resolved in the absence of direct explanation.
The Court in Cleveland insisted that "[w]hen faced with a plaintiff's previous sworn
statement asserting 'total disability' or the like, the court should require an
explanation of any apparent inconsistency with the necessary elements of an ADA
claim." Id. Unlike the plaintiff in Cleveland, Feldman failed to offer any
explanation for the contradiction between her SSDI and ADA statements. We therefore will
affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment
v. City of Chicago, 194 F.3d 788 (1999)
v. Michelin North America, Inc., 183 F.3d 592 (1999) The central
question in this case is whether the "reasonable accommodation" requirement
under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. sec. 12101 et seq.,
requires an employer to transfer an employee to an occupied position that the disabled
employee has a right to acquire under the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement.
The district court concluded the ADA contains no such requirement and granted summary
judgment for defendant Michelin North America, Inc. ("Michelin"). We affirm.
v. ITT Educational Services, Inc., 176 F.3d 934 (1999) However,
Cozad, in assessing plaintiff's attendance record, could and did reasonably decide as a
matter of good business judgment, even considering plaintiff to be otherwise qualified,
that plaintiff's attendance habits might not sufficiently adjust to the strict
requirements of the outside sales representative position, and, in any event, did not
merit the promotion. The Institute did not need to knowingly assume the risk of getting
itself into a similar "erratic absences" situation like that from which the
employer escaped in Waggoner. The district court gave all plaintiff's claims
careful consideration before granting the Institute summary judgment. A genuine issue of
material fact requires more than a showing of "some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts." Matsushita, 475
U.S. at 586 (citations omitted). It cannot be said in the circumstances of this case
that the record taken as a whole could possibly lead a rational trier of fact to find some
genuine factual issue for trial. See id. at 587 (citation omitted). We find no fault with
the district court's entry of summary judgment for the Institute in declining to
substitute its business judgment for the nondiscriminatory business judgment of the
v. Decatur Foundry, Inc., 177 F.3d 599 (1999) Koshinski
wanted to go back to work despite the pain and the harm he would cause himself--
understandable, given that the foundry paid him twice the hourly wage he was able to earn
from subsequent employers. He argues that the foundry should have allowed him to go back
to work even if it meant that he would suffer considerable pain and cause his condition to
worsen. That a person may cause a direct threat to himself, he argues, is of no
consequence under the ADA. Kohnke v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 1110, 1111-12
(N.D. Ill. 1996), in which the district court held that the "direct threat"
language in the ADA refers to direct threats to other individuals, not to the disabled
person himself, supports his position. But see 29 C.F.R. sec. 1630.2(r) ("Direct
Threat means a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the
individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable
accommodation.") (emphasis added). The "direct threat" issue arises,
however, only after an ADA plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, as an employer's
defense to the challenged adverse employment decision. See 42 U.S.C. sec. 12113(b).
Because Koshinski cannot show that he was entitled to protection under the ADA, we do not
reach the question of whether the foundry had a valid defense for refusing to reinstate
v. Henderson, 188 F.3d 740 (1999) Sanchez
does not allege that Holman mis- perceived him as limited generally in the work he could
perform for the USPS, see Johnson v. American Chamber of Commerce Publications, 108 F.3d
818 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that impairment need not actually be substantially limiting
so long as it is perceived by employer to be), and it is undisputed that Holman knew
Sanchez could perform other tasks like sorting mail or answering telephones. See Baulos v.
Roadway Express, Inc., 139 F.3d 1147, 1151 (7th Cir. 1998). If, as Sanchez implicitly
concedes, his inability to resume letter carrying does not amount to a substantial
impairment under the Act, the USPS's accurate perception of that same inability would not
trigger the Act's protections; the plaintiff must be regarded as having a substantial
impairment, not just any impairment. See Hamm v. Runyon, 51 F.3d 721, 724 (7th Cir. 1995)
(citing 29 C.F.R. sec.1613.702(e)); see also Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385 (5th
Cir. 1993) (employer's belief that employee is unable to perform one task safely does not
by itself establish that employer regarded employee as having substantial limitation of
his ability to work in general so as to render employee "disabled" under
Rehabilitation Act); Welsh v. City of Tulsa, 977 F.2d 1415, 1417-18 (10th Cir. 1992)
(holding that an impairment that an employer regards as limiting an individual's ability
to perform only one job is not a handicap under the Rehabilitation Act)./2 Sanchez has
simply not shown that the USPS regarded him as substantially impaired, and he has thus
failed to establish a disability under the Act. Baulos, 139 F.3d at 1152; see Christian v.
St. Anthony Med. Ctr., Inc., 117 F.3d 1051, 1053 (7th Cir. 1997); Hamm, 51 F.3d at 725. We
therefore agree with the district court that the USPS is entitled to summary judgment on
v. Olin Corp., 169 F.3d 481 (1999). We
said in Haschmann that a business "was not obligated to tolerate erratic, unreliable
attendance or to provide an accommodation which would impose an undue hardship on the
business." At 601. Waggoner did not indicate that she was requesting a leave so that
she would have time to refine the dosage of her medication so that she could return to
work on a regular basis. All she said on the subject at her discharge hearing was, "I
just want to know if I'm employed here or not." She simply wanted to miss work
whenever she felt she needed to and apparently for so long as she felt she needed to. As a
matter of law, that request in this context was not reasonable, and accordingly the
judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED
v. Anderson, 168 F.3d 1029 (1999) we
focus on Foster's specific allegations. She points to Jones' inquiry, upon seeing Foster's
hand splint, of whether Foster had carpal tunnel syndrome. Foster told her "no,"
she had tendinitis. A month later (the day before Foster was terminated) when she arrived
late for work, Foster presented a doctor's recommendation that she be placed on light
typing duty. Foster cites these incidents as reasons why Andersen reacted to her
disability and fired her. The district court considered these facts in conjunction with
Andersen's longstanding complaints about Foster's performance. It also considered Foster's
admission that she was on final warning status and had recently been warned that a single
misstep would result in termination. Despite these warnings, Foster readily admits that
she was late for work and that she violated Andersen's policies by failing to inform
Andersen of her tardiness within thirty minutes of her scheduled start time. Considering
all of the evidence, the district court reasonably found that Foster failed to create a
triable issue concerning whether her request for an accommodation was a factor that
motivated Andersen to terminate her. In short, the court determined that her termination
did not occur "because of" her disability
v. Adams, F.3d (1999) The
"otherwise qualified" phrase, which also appears in the ADA, supplied the
foundation of our conclusion in Palmer that, although paranoia is a
"disability," a person whose disability disposes him to violent outbursts is not
"otherwise qualified" for employment; an employer need not
"accommodate" the disability by hiring guards to watch its workforce. Just so
here. Rush Anchor was entitled to establish a program for mild-mannered drug abusers, and
people who threaten to kill their supervisors are not "qualified" for such a
program even if their threats are hollow. Substance-abuse programs often try to help
participants control their anger; an inability to deal with participants whose anger is
out of control would send the wrong message to others. Chapa had for some time been
insistent that he did not have to follow the program's rules--that he knew better than
Fletcher how to deal with his problems. Fletcher was legally entitled to treat the threat
as the last straw, and to conclude that Chapa was no longer qualified for the Rush Anchor
v. State Dept. of Health & Family Services, 166 F.3d 980 (1999). We
agree with the district court that Duncan failed to present evidence that would have
justified a jury's finding that he was perceived to suffer from a "disability"
within the meaning of the two laws. Furthermore, even if Duncan's propensity to lose his
temper counted as a statutory disability, our decision in Palmer v. Circuit Court of Cook
County, 117 F.3d 351 (7th Cir. 1997), suggests that the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims
would founder on the qualifications requirement. We therefore have no occasion to reach
the defendants' alternative arguments in support of the judgment, including their
assertion that Duncan could prevail only if he could show that his perceived disability
was the sole reason he was terminated as opposed to a "but for" cause.
v. Komatsu Min. Systems, Inc., 165 F.3d 554 (1999). For
a number of reasons, we find that to award back pay to Flowers for the entire period from
his termination to the trial was an abuse of discretion. Clearly, there are times when
Flowers could not work, with or without an accommodation. The most obvious is the time
following his surgery (a lumbar laminectomy and spinal fusion) in May 1994. Flowers' own
physician, Dr. Patrick Tracy, while he testified that at some point Flowers could have
returned to work, did not indicate that Flowers was able to work as of October 1994,
apparently the last time he saw him. In addition, there were other surgeries as well.
These events must be considered in fashioning a proper back-pay award. Also guiding the
court's discretion, as part of the evidence, should be the fact that Flowers received
disability benefits from the Social Security Administration. The court can consider
statements made on the applications for benefits and doctors' representations in support
of the applications, keeping in mind that the ultimate issue is whether during the
relevant period of time for which back pay is sought Flowers could have performed his
duties at Komatsu, with or without an accommodation. By way of illustration only, after
these factors are considered, it may be that the judge would find that Flowers was able to
work at Komatsu for, say, 20 of the 40- plus months between his discharge and the trial.
He would, of course, then be entitled to back pay for only those 20 months.
v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626 (1998). Gary
Baert, a truck driver who lost his job when he was diagnosed with insulin-dependent
diabetes, sued his employer under the Americans With Disabilities Act for failing to
reasonably accommodate him. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendant, finding that Baert was not a "qualified individual" as defined by the
ADA. Although we agree that Baert was no longer qualified for his job as a truck driver
due to federal and state laws which prohibited him from holding a commercial driver's
license, we reverse because he may have been a qualified individual with respect to other
positions which the employer could have offered as a reasonable accommodation.
v. KFC Nat. Management Co., 140 F.3d 1090 (1998). Mr.
Talanda has failed to demonstrate the reasonableness of his belief that Overly's demand
was evidence that she regarded and treated Bellson as having an impairment which limited
Bellson's major life activity of working. Indeed, the record does not show that Mr.
Talanda tried to ascertain, in any reasonable way, whether Overly's order violated the
ADA. Nor did Mr. Talanda inform Overly or Malloy that he was refusing to move Bellson in
order to protect her from Overly's discriminatory activity. Therefore, KFC's firing of Mr.
Talanda for his refusal to move Bellson was not a discriminatory act against Mr. Talanda
and was not protected under the ADA.
v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 139 F.3d 1147 (1998). Plaintiffs
neither had an impairment that substantially limited their ability to perform the major
life activity of working nor were regarded as having such an impairment by Roadway. The
record does not support a finding that plaintiffs' impairment of driving sleeper trucks
would disqualify them from most other truck driving positions (class of jobs). Baulos and
Schneider were merely unable to perform the particular position at Roadway that entailed
driving sleeper trucks. Additionally, the majority of truck drivers assigned to sleeper
duty had difficulty getting sufficient rest, as would most members of the general public.
Having reached this determination we need not consider the additional grounds suggested by
Roadway for affirming the judgment of the district court.
v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F3d 499 (1998). The
Midelfort Clinic in Eau Claire, Wisconsin terminated Barbara Davidson from her position as
a psychotherapist, citing among her principal deficiencies her backlog of dictation.
Davidson filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act, contending that as a result
of Adult Residual Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder ("ADD"), she has a
"disability" as the ADA defines that term and that Midelfort refused to
reasonably accommodate that disability. See 42 U.S.C. sec. 12112(b)(5)(A). She also
claimed that Midelfort discharged her in retaliation for filing a claim of discrimination
with the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. sec.12203(a). The district court entered summary judgment in
favor of Midelfort. Because we conclude that Davidson has presented sufficient evidence
that she has a "record" of a substantially limiting impairment, we reverse the
judgment in part and remand for further proceedings. We otherwise affirm the judgment
below on the disability claim for lack of evidence that Davidson presently has a
substantially limiting impairment resulting from ADD or that Midelfort regarded her as
having such an impairment. Because Davidson has not identified sufficient evidence of a
causal link between the filing of her original charge of discrimination and her subsequent
termination, we also affirm the entry of summary judgment on the retaliation claim.
Stan v. Fancy Colours & Co., 125 F.3d 563 (1997). Thus,
the jury's verdict in favor of Van Stan on his emotional distress claim is not per se
inconsistent with its finding that Fancy Colours had not violated the ADA. Contrary to Van
Stan's assertions, even if the jury concluded that Fancy Colours had fired Van Stan
because he requested that his workload be reduced and that Fancy Colours had lied to him
about its reasons for firing him, that would not compel the jury to find in his favor on
the ADA claim. Instead, the jury could have concluded that Van Stan failed to establish
other elements of his claim. For example, based on the evidence presented at trial, a
reasonable jury could have concluded that Van Stan was not disabled within the meaning of
the ADA. Both Van Stan and his expert testified that Van Stan's disorder did not affect
his ability to perform his duties as a warehouse manager. Likewise, both testified that
the disorder did not affect his ability to walk, talk, see, hear, speak or communicate.
Thus, a reasonable jury could have concluded that Van Stan's disorder did not
substantially limit a major life activity and, hence, that Van Stan was not disabled.
Mackie v. Runyon, 804 F. Supp. 1508, 1510-11 (M.D. Fla. 1992) (plaintiff who controlled
her bipolar disorder with medication was not handicapped under the Rehabilitation Act
because her disorder did not limit her major life activities).
Sieberns v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 125 F.3d 1019 (1997).
v. Zalk Josephs Fabricators, Inc., 121 F.3d 1133 (1997). The undisputed
evidence shows nothing from which a jury could find a causal connection between Uhl's
demotion and any perception by Zalk that he was disabled.
v. American Chamber of Commerce Publishers, Inc., 108 F.3d 818 (1997). Congress
could have written the statute so that the presence of some kind of
objectively-ascertainable condi- tion serves as a filter. An objective threshold might
help the courts to discard implausible claims without the need for costly discovery. Yet
no benefit comes free of cost, and a screening device of this kind is not in the package
of rights and obligations Congress enacted. If for no reason whatsoever an employer
regards a person as dis- abled--if, for example, because of a blunder in reading medical
records it imputes to him a heart condition he has never had--and takes adverse action, it
has violated the statute unless some other portion of the law affords it a defense. The
statute forbids "discrimination against '[a] person who has a record of, or is
regarded as having, an impairment [but who] may at present have no actual incapacity at
all.' " School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480
U.S. 273, 279 (1987), quoting from South- eastern Community College v. Davis, 442
U.S. 397, 405-06 n.6 (1979). Other courts of appeals have said or held that the
plaintiff need not establish any actual impairment to found a claim on sec. 1202(2)(C).
E.g., Harris v. H&W Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516, 523 (11th Cir. 1996); MacDonald v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc., 94 F.3d 1437, 1443 (10th Cir. 1996); Bridges v. Bossier, 92 F.3d
329, 332 (5th Cir. 1996); Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1996). Katz
reversed a decision similar to the district court's treatment of Johnson's complaint. We
do likewise; unlike Johnson, the Americans with Disabilities Act has teeth.
v. Charter Hosp. of Northwest Indiana, 104 F.3d 116 (1997). here
Grzan alleges only mistreatment by Greer. Grzan complains that she received treatment
different from that received by other handicapped persons accepted into Charter's
treatment program not because of any institutional policy but because of the aberrant
conduct of one of Charter's counselors. In essence, Grzan alleges malpractice. Grzan's
complaint fails because section 504 does not provide a federal malpractice tort remedy.
Section 504 is materially identical to the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. sec.
sec. 12101 et seq. ("ADA"), which we recently held did not provide a remedy for
medical malpractice. See Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246, 249 (7th Cir. 1996) ("it
would be extremely odd to suppose that disabled persons whose disability is treated
negligently have a federal malpractice claim by virtue of the Americans With Disabilities
Act, whereas a sick or injured but not disabled person-- a person suffering from an acute
viral infection, perhaps, or who has broken his leg, or who has a hernia or an inflamed
gall bladder--must be content with the remedy that the state law of medical malpractice
v. Northwestern University, 101 F.3d 473 (1996). In
closing, we wish to make clear that we are not saying Northwestern's decision necessarily
is the right decision. We say only that it is not an illegal one under the Rehabilitation
Act. On the same facts, another team physician at another university, reviewing the same
medical history, physical evaluation, and medical recommendations, might reasonably decide
that Knapp met the physical qualifications for playing on an intercollegiate basketball
team. Simply put, all universities need not evaluate risk the same way. What we say in
this case is that if substantial evidence supports the decision-maker--here Northwestern--
that decision must be respected
v. United Airlines, Inc., 95 F.3d 492 (1996). Cheryl
Gile sued United Airlines, Inc., alleging that United discriminated against her in
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act when it failed to reassign her to a
position on the day or afternoon shift after her disability made her unable to work on the
night shift. In discovery, Gile requested documents pertaining to all United job vacancies
in the Chicago metropolitan area. The district court limited her request to vacancies for
the same position in the department where she had worked and to positions to which she had
previously requested transfer. The district court subsequently granted summary judgment in
favor of United on the ground that United could not possibly have reasonably accommodated
Gile because Gile could not show that there was a suitable vacant position to which United
could have transferred her. Gile appeals the discovery order and the grant of summary
judgment. Because we find that the district judge imposed an overly narrow restriction on
the scope of Gile's document request, we vacate the judgment and remand the case for
v. Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477 (1996). In
the cases primarily relied upon by the district court, the conclusion that the plaintiff's
employment was not limited generally was reached only after an analysis of specific
evidence on a motion for summary judgment or following a trial. See id. (jury trial);
Gupton, 14 F.3d 203 (bench trial); Roth, 57 F.3d 1446 (preliminary injunction hearing);
Hamm, 51 F.3d 721 (summary judgment); Daley v. Koch, 892 F.2d 212 (2d Cir. 1989) (summary
judgment). Following discovery, we surmise that Homeyer's claim may well be susceptible to
a motion for summary judgment on the same grounds. It is our judgment that a motion to
dismiss was simply the wrong vehicle for a disability determination in this case. In sum,
although we suspect it will be very difficult for Homeyer to establish that her major life
function of working is substantially limited, we cannot say beyond a doubt that Homeyer,
if given an opportunity to submit evidence, would not be able to support her claim that
her ability to find work as a typist generally is substantially limited by her respiratory
v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246 (1996). His
complaint is that he was not given special ac- commodation. Unlike the prisoner plaintiffs
in Love v. McBride, 896 F. Supp. 808 (N.D. Ind. 1995), or Donnell v. Illinois State Bd. of
Education, 829 F. Supp. 1016, 1020 (N.D. Ill. 1993), he is not complaining of being
excluded from some prison service, program, or activity, for example an exercise program
that his paraplegia would prevent him from taking part in without some modification of the
program. He is complaining about incompetent treatment of his paraplegia. The ADA does not
create a remedy for medical malpractice.
v. Lutheran General Hosp., 57 F.3d 1446 (1995). The
Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act are important legislation that
seek to integrate dis- abled individuals into the economic and social mainstream, and to
ensure that the truly disabled will not face dis- crimination because of stereotypes or
their insurmountable impairments. See 29 U.S.C. sec. 701; S. REP. NO. 116, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess. 2 (1989). However, there is a clear bright line of demarcation between extending
the statutory pro- tection to a truly disabled individual (so that he or she can lead a
normal life, see McWright v. Alexander, 982 F.2d 222, 227 (7th Cir. 1992)) and allowing an
individual with marginal impairment to use disability laws as bar- gaining chips to gain a
competitive advantage. The district court's evaluation that Dr. Roth fell on the wrong
side of the line is well-supported in this record, and the district court's ruling under
the circumstances cannot be consid- ered clearly erroneous. There is no abuse of
discretion. The judgment of the district court denying the plaintiff's request for a
preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED
Hamm v. Runyon, 51 F.3d 721 (1995).
Johnson v. Runyon, 47 F.3d 911 (1995).
U.S. v. Village of Palatine, Ill., 37 F.3d 1230 (1994).
McWright v. Alexander, 982 F.2d 222 (1992).
Byrne v. Board of Educ., School of West Allis-West Milwaukee, 979 F.2d 560
Carter v. Casa Cent., 849 F.2d 1048 (1988).
Anderson v. University of Wisconsin, 841 F.2d 737 (1988).
Adashunas v. Negley, 626 F.2d 600 (1980).