Return to Selected Americans With Disabilities Act/504 Cases Court's Index
Green v. City of New York, 465 F.3d 65 C.A.2 (10/2006) Because a reasonable jury could find that Giblin declined to evaluate Walter's alleged non-verbal and computer-generated
indicators of refusal to accept treatment on account of his disability, the district court erred by
granting summary judgment dismissing Walter's ADA claim against the City.
Graves v. Finch Pruyn & Co., Inc., 457 F.3d 181 (7/2006) Viewing the record in the light most favorable to
Graves, it 2 was imprecise to call the requested leave of
absence "indefinite." A factfinder could find, based on
Graves's testimony that he asked for "more time" to get a
doctor's appointment and that it would take a "couple of
Graves requested two weeks of leave -
a finite amount of time —
to see Dr. O'Connor and learn of his chances for rehabilitation.
Granting this leave of absence would not require Finch Pruyn to
hold open Graves's position indefinitely. See Parker, 204
F.3d at 338 ("The duty to make reasonable accommodations does
not . . . require an employer to hold an injured employee's
position open indefinitely . . . ."). The district court erred
in rejecting Graves's claim on the basis that the requested
leave was "indefinite," and accordingly, we vacate the grant of summary
judgment as to this claim of disability discrimination.
Sista v. CDC Ixis North America, Inc., 445 F.3d 161 (4/2006)
we conclude that the District
Court erred in holding that Sista was not "otherwise qualified" to
reassume his position at CDC because he "pose[d] a direct
threat" to his co-workers. Although we cannot state definitively
whether Sista made a prima facie showing under the ADA or
related state and municipal laws without determining whether
Sista's mental illness qualified as a disability, we need not
address these questions to the extent that the District Court was
correct in holding that CDC had a legitimate non-discriminatory
basis for terminating Sista.
Fuller v. J.P Morgan Chase & Co., 423 F.3d 104 (9/2005) Plaintiff
Christine A. Fuller contends that the termination of her long-term disability benefits (i)
violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (the "ADA") because the employer's
plan affords a shorter period of coverage for impairments that are mental rather than
physical, and (ii) was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act ("ERISA"). She appeals from the judgment of the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Block, J.), dismissing
her complaint. Fuller's argument conflates her disability with its underlying cause. Since
Fuller's disability arises from a mental syndrome known as bipolar disorder, it is neither
arbitrary nor capricious to limit Fuller's benefits, regardless of whether that disorder
in turn has a physical cause.
v. City of New York, 422 F.3d 47 (9/2005) Capobianco brought this action
against DOS and the City of New York (the "City"), alleging violations of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (the "ADA"),
and state and city law. The district court granted defendants' summary judgment motion and
dismissed the complaint because it concluded that no reasonable jury could find that
Capobianco was disabled or that defendants regarded him as being disabled within the
meaning of the ADA. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority, 396 F.3d 187 (1/2005)
Plaintiff, a bus driver for defendant, claims that the District Court erred in finding
that it was "consistent with business necessity" under the Americans with
Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §12112(d)(4), for defendant to require
plaintiff to disclose the results of his HIV-related laboratory tests.Here, the
representations by plaintiff, signed by his doctor, on an application for intermittent
leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act that "[m]y own serious health condition
renders me unable to perform the functions of my position," that his condition left
him "unable to perform work of any kind," and that "[patient] will need
intermittent leave at undetermined times for lifetime," demonstrates that the
employer had "legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons to doubt the employee's capacity
to perform his ... duties." Conroy, 33 F.3d at 98. Furthermore, requesting
existing laboratory data is surely "a reasonably effective method of achieving the
employer's goal" of determining whether plaintiff could safely perform those duties. Id.
We thus reject plaintiff's claim that the inquiry violated the ADA.
v. DiMarzio, Inc. 386 F.3d 192 (10/2004) Defendant DiMarzio, Inc.
("DiMarzio") appeals from judgment entered after a jury trial in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Block, J.) awarding
$190,000 in damages to Plaintiff Audrey Jacques, a former DiMarzio employee who alleged
that DiMarzio fired her because she was "regarded as" disabled, in violation of
the Americans with Disabilities Act (the "ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C).
Jacques cross-appeals from a ruling that she failed to make out prima facie claims
under 42 U .S.C. §§ 12102(2)(A) (discrimination against the disabled) and (B)
(discrimination against those with a "record" of a disability). We hold that the
district court erred when it instructed the jury that an impairment causing a
"perceived" demeanor of (inter alia ) "hostility" and
"social withdrawal" qualifies under the ADA as a "perceived"
disability substantially limiting Jacques's ability to "interact with others."
We affirm the district court's ruling that Jacques failed to make out prima facie
claims under either 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(2)(A) or (B).
Anesthesia Group of Onondaga, P.C., 369 F.3d 113 (5/2004) we conclude that
Dr. Rodal is not judicially estopped from claiming that he was qualified to perform the
duties of a Group anesthesiologist with reasonable accommodation by statements he made in
earlier state court proceedings about the extent of his disability. We further conclude
that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to Dr. Rodal, does not permit a
court to conclude as a matter of law that (1) Dr. Rodal failed to seek any accommodation
for his disability from the Group in 1999; or (2) if he did seek an accommodation, it was
unreasonable because it would have required relieving him from essential job functions; or
(3) even if his requested accommodation was reasonable, it nevertheless imposed an undue
burden on the Anesthesia Group. Accordingly, we REVERSE the May 18, 2003 judgment in favor
of the Anesthesia Group and REMAND the case to the district court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion, including further consideration of Dr. Rodal's status as a
Powell v. National Bd. of Medical Examiners, University of
Connecticut School of Medicine,364 F.3d 79 (4/2004) Affairs, entered in the the District of Connecticut
(Thompson, J.) on October 7, 2002. Plaintiff, a student at the 38 school of medicine, was
required by the school to pass an examination administered by the
National Board. She unsuccessfully requested an accommodation on account of her alleged
disability. As a result of that denial, plaintiff filed suit against defendants under the
Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act.
v. West Haven Fire Dept., 352 F.3d 565 (12/2003) The court used the
appropriate factors and the evidence presented supports its findings. Among other 9
things, the district court noted the history of hostility of neighborhood residents to
OH-JH and their pressure on the Mayor and other city officials. Evidence supports
the court's finding that this hostility motivated the City in initiating and continuing
its enforcement efforts. We also affirm the district court's finding that plaintiffs
requested a reasonable accommodation and the City failed to grant it. The City is not
required to grant an exception for a group of people to live as a single family, but it
cannot deny the variance request based solely on plaintiffs' handicap where the requested
accommodation is reasonable. The district court found that these plaintiffs operated much
like a family. Additionally, there is evidence that these particular plaintiffs needed to
live in group homes located in single-family areas. We affirm the district court's award
of compensatory damages and attorney's fees in its entirety and pause briefly to discuss
its inclusion of a damages award for an attorney's involvement in the Zoning Board appeal.
"The standard of review of an award of attorney's fees is highly deferential to the
district court. Because attorney's fees are dependent on the unique facts of each case,
the resolution of this issue is committed to the discretion of the district court." Baker
v. Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 264 F.3d 144, 149 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Mautner v.
Hirsch, 2 32 F.3d 37, 39 (2d Cir. 1994)). The district court's award of attorney's
fees, as well as its entire damages award, was not excessive but rather carefully
calculated and reasonable.
v. State of Vermont, 340 F.3d 27 (8/2003) We hold that (i) plaintiffs alleged
a sufficient injury-in-fact to support standing to challenge Act 114; (ii) this case is
ripe for adjudication; (iii) Act 114 violates the ADA by distingushing between
"qualified individuals" on the basis of mental illness; and (iv) the District
Court's injunction prohibiting enforcement of certain provisions of Act 114 does not
constitute a fundamental alteration to Vermont's DPOA program.
Anthony v. City of New York, 339 F.3d 129 (8/2003) Anthony's argument that the City
of New York violated the ADA also fails, because there is no evidence that the warrantless
seizure was motivated by discrimination against individuals with disabilities.
v. United Technologies Corp., 337 F.3d 271 (7/2003) Whether the CFEPA
includes a cause of action for perceived physical disability
discrimination is precisely such a question of law and, given the absence of any
ambiguity, we decline to defer to the Connecticut Commission's view. See Lieberman v.
State Bd. of Labor Relations, 216 Conn. 253, 263-64 (1990) (declining to defer to board's
view because, in part, "the board's interpretation of the statutory scheme at issue
is a question of law that has not previously been subjected to judicial scrutiny").
v. Rochester-Genesee Regional Transp. Authority, 337 F.3d 201 (7/2003) The
plaintiffs, twelve disabled individuals and a disability rights organization, allege that
the defendants' paratransit system for disabled persons in the Rochester, New York area
violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. ("ADA"
or the "Act"). The defendants moved for summary judgment in lieu of answering
the complaint, and the plaintiffs cross-moved for summary judgment on three of their four
claims. The United States District Court for the Western District of New York (Larimer,
J.) granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and enjoined the defendants to
comply with their obligations under the ADA. We affirm the grant of injunctive relief, but
on grounds somewhat different from those upon which the district court relied, grounds
which may require the district court to modify the injunction on remand.
Cameron v. Community Aid For Retarded Children, Inc., 335 F.3d 60
Cameron's conceded inability to get along with Johnston drove away an employee whom she
was supposed to be supervising, and since Cameron does not claim that the inability is
caused by any actual disability within the meaning of the ADA, it is clear that she was
unqualified to be a supervisor. When an accommodation is requested and denied, and the
employee brings an ADA claim premised on that denial, summary judgment may be granted
against the plaintiff if the accommodation is one without which performance of an
essential job function is impaired, and if the requested accommodation is unreasonable.
Southington Bd. of Educ., 334 F.3d 217 (6/2003) In Morse v. Univ. of
Vermont, 973 F.2d 122, 127 (2d Cir. 1992), we held that all "actions under § 504
of the Rehabilitation Act are governed by the state statute of limitations applicable to
personal injury actions." In Connecticut, § 52-577 provides a three-year limitations
period for all tort actions including personal injury claims. Because plaintiffs' claims
accrued more than three years before they requested a due process hearing, their
Rehabilitation Act claims are also time-barred.
Conroy v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Services, 333 F.3d 88
conclude that Fountain has sufficiently alleged that she has suffered and will continue to
suffer the injury prohibited by the ADA's prohibition against inquiries into disability.
She is therefore an appropriate plaintiff to bring this challenge to the Policy under 42
U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A). It is clear that even what DOCS refers to as a "general
diagnosis" may tend to reveal a disability. We hold that requiring a general
diagnosis is sufficient to trigger the protections of the ADA under this provision and
that summary judgment in Fountain's favor was appropriate on this element. Few courts have
interpreted this provision, but one court has found that a requirement that employees
disclose what prescription drugs they use is a prohibited inquiry, since such a policy
would reveal disabilities (or perceived disabilities) to employers. See Roe v. Cheyenne
Mountain Conference Resort, 920 F.Supp. 1153, 1154-55 (D. Colo. 1996), aff'd in pertinent
part, 124 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 1997). Similarly, we believe that since general diagnoses
may expose individuals with disabilities to employer stereotypes, the Policy implicates
the concerns expressed in these provisions of the ADA.
Shannon v. New York City Transit Authority, 332 F.3d 95 (6/2003) Former
city bus driver brought action against public transit authorities, alleging disability
discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and state law violations
after driver was permanently restricted from driving city buses upon discovery that he had
difficulties distinguishing traffic signal colors. The United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York, 189 F.Supp.2d 55, Sweet, J., granted summary judgment
in favor of defendants, and driver appealed. The Court of Appeals, Jacobs, Circuit Judge,
held that: (1) depositions of three examining eye doctors were sufficient to demonstrate
that driver's color-blindness rendered him unable to differentiate traffic light colors,
as required for finding that driver was not qualified, under ADA, to continue driving
buses; (2) color differentiation was a qualification that authorities could properly deem
"essential" for driving a bus, and thus driver could not perform "essential
functions" of his position, as required for claim of disability discrimination under
ADA; (3) driver's inability to distinguish colors of traffic lights was fatal to his claim
under the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL) and the New York City Human Rights Law
(NYCHRL) that authorities had affirmative duty to accommodate his "regarded as"
disability; and (4) even if authorities had affirmative duty to accommodate driver's
"regarded as" disability, driver failed to identify any reasonable accommodation
that authorities failed to provide. Affirmed
D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261 (6/2003) City residents with acquired immune
deficiency syndrome (AIDS) or HIV-related illnesses brought class action against city for
violating Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Rehabilitation Act, and various other
federal, state, and city laws by failing to provide meaningful access to public assistance
programs, benefits, and services. The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York, Sterling Johnson, Jr., J., 119 F.Supp.2d 181, entered judgment for
plaintiffs, and defendants appealed. The Court of Appeals, Katzmann, Circuit Judge, held
that: (1) plaintiff advancing a reasonable accommodation claim under Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) or Rehabilitation Act need not also show that the challenged
program or practice has a disparate impact on persons with disabilities; (2) a plaintiff
with disabilities suing under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act may show that he or she has
been excluded from or denied the benefits of a public entity's services or programs
"by reason of such disability" even if there are other contributory causes for
the exclusion or denial, as long as the plaintiff can show that the disability was a
substantial cause of the exclusion or denial; (3) injunctive relief to remedy violation of
the ADA or Rehabilitation Act was appropriate; (4) state officer sued in her official
capacity under the doctrine of Ex parte Young was a "public entity"
subject to liability under ADA. Affirmed.
Felix v. New York City Transit Authority, 324 F.3d 102, (3/2003) Felix
contends that her case falls within our precedents by arguing that her insomnia and her
fear of being in the subway are part of the same singular mental disability, the PTSD, and
thus her inability to work in the subway is also "because of the disability."
However, we do not view her insomnia and fear of the subway as a singular mental
condition: They are two mental conditions that derive from the same traumatic incident. In
cases involving conditions like AIDS that are discrete diseases with pervasive effects, it
will frequently be obvious that the lesser impairment is caused by the disability.
However, in situations like plaintiff's where it is not clear that a single, particular
medical condition is responsible for both the disability and the lesser impairment, the
plaintiff must show a causal connection between the specific condition which impairs a
major life activity and the accommodation. Felix has not done so here. Finally, we note
that our interpretation of the language of the statute is supported by policy
considerations. The ADA serves the important function of ensuring that people with
disabilities are given the same opportunities and are able to enjoy the same benefits as
other Americans. The ADA mandates reasonable accommodation of people with disabilities in
order to put them on an even playing field with the non-disabled; it does not authorize a
preference for disabled people generally. See U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535
U.S. 391, 122 S.Ct. 1516, 1521, 152 L.Ed.2d 589 (2002). The interpretation advanced by
Felix and the EEOC would transform the ADA from an act that prohibits discrimination into
an act that requires treating people with disabilities better than others who are not
disabled but have the same impairment for which accommodation is sought. We think that the
ADA deliberately speaks in terms of eliminating discrimination and thus do not interpret
it so broadly as to require the accommodation of impairments that do not limit major life
activities whenever the person with an impairment happens to also have a disability.
v. Rumsfeld, 320 F.3d 309, (2/2003) According to Voisine's deposition
testimony, Peterson explicitly stated prior to the RIF that "the new organization was
not going to be able to run with" Kinsella because Peterson "just did not
believe that a blind person could run copiers and do print work." And of the eight
people terminated in the RIF, only Kinsella was not rehired by either DPS, DFAS's new
print shop, which was also under Peterson's supervision, or otherwise by DFAS, whose
management Peterson had contacted about rehiring those terminated in the course of the
RIF. Boudreau, whom Kinsella had trained, was tapped for the temporary job at DFAS's new
print shop despite the fact that she was junior to Kinsella. These circumstances, viewed
in their entirety, would permit a reasonable finder of fact to conclude that Peterson used
the legitimate RIF as an opportunity to terminate Kinsella because of his disability.
Failure to Promote To establish a prima facie case of discriminatory failure to promote, a
plaintiff must "allege that she or he applied for a specific position or positions
and was rejected therefrom, rather than merely asserting that on several occasions she or
he generally requested promotion." Brown v. Coach Stores, Inc., 163 F.3d 706, 710 (2d
Cir. 1998). Kinsella does not allege and the record does not indicate that he applied for
specific positions or that positions became available and were filled by others,3 but
merely that he repeatedly requested a promotion. Kinsella thus failed to establish a prima
facie case that he was denied promotion because of his disability.
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the order of the district court is affirmed with
respect to the failure to promote claim and vacated with respect to the unlawful
termination claim, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
v. Baldwin Union Free School Dist., 320 F.3d 164, (2/2003) The district
court's dismissal of the Rehabilitation Act claim and the analogous state law claim was
based on its finding that Peters had failed to show she had a protected disability within
the meaning of the Act, because she failed to show that she was perceived by the
defendants as incapable of working in a broad range of jobs. Peters presented evidence
from which a reasonable jury could have concluded that the defendants terminated her
because they perceived her as suicidal and therefore as substantially limited in her
ability to care for herself. This was sufficient to support a claim under the Act and the
Human Rights Law. We therefore vacate the dismissal of the Rehabilitation Act and Human
Rights Law claims.
v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., --- F.3d ---, (2/2003) J.B. Hunt
Transport, Inc. chose not to employ over-the-road truck drivers who used prescription
medications with side effects that might impair driving ability. The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission argued that under the Americans with Disabilities Act, Hunt's
decision violated the rights of job applicants using those medications. We disagree.
v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., --- F.3d ---, (2/2003) Dissent
Treglia v. Town of Manlius, 313 F.3d 713 (12/2002)
v. Board of Educ. of City of New York, 287 F.3d 138 (3/2002) Plaintiff-appellants
Rose Weixel ("Rose") and her mother, Frances Weixel, ("Ms. Weixel")
(collectively, "plaintiffs") appeal from an August 8, 2000, judgment of the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Deborah A. Batts, District
Judge) that dismissed plaintiffs' amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See
Weixel v. Board of Educ. of City of New York, No. 97-CV-9367, 2000 WL 1100395
(S.D.N.Y., August 7, 2000). Because we find that the district court failed to construe the
plaintiffs' pro se complaint liberally, and because we find that plaintiffs
have stated claims for relief under several of their causes of action, we reverse as to
the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' causes of action under the Rehabilitation
Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), the Individuals with
Disabilities in Education Act ("IDEA"), and Section 1983, and we direct the
district court to consider plaintiffs' substantive and procedural due process claims,
conspiracy claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, and their supplemental state law claims.
However, we affirm as to the dismissal of their claims under the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Federal Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974
Economic Community Action Program Inc. v. City of Middleton, 281 F.3d 333 (2/2002)
The plaintiff, Regional Economic Community Action Program, Inc.
("RECAP"), and the intervenor-plaintiff, the United States of America, brought
this action under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.
("FHA"), the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.
("ADA"), and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. They
alleged that the defendants -- the City of Middletown ("Middletown" or "the
City"), located in Orange County, New York, the City of Middletown Planning Board
("Planning Board"), and Joseph DeStefano, the mayor of Middletown --
discriminated against RECAP on the basis of its clients' disabilities by refusing to grant
RECAP a special-use permit authorizing it to establish two halfway houses for recovering
alcoholics. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
(Charles L. Brieant, Judge) granted summary judgment to the defendants on all of
the plaintiffs' claims. Because we find sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror
could infer disparate treatment by the City and the Planning Board and retaliation by the
City and DeStefano, we vacate the district court's grant of summary judgment as to those
claims. But we affirm the court's grant of summary judgment on the disparate impact claim
against all three defendants and the discrimination claims against DeStefano.
v. City of New York, 274 F.3d 740 (12/2001) We affirm the
district court's dismissal of Giordano's ADA claim because we agree that he failed to
offer evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that the defendants
"regarded him as disabled" within the meaning of the ADA. We also affirm the
court's dismissal of Giordano's § 1983 claims. The record contains nothing to suggest
that the alleged disparate treatment of Giordano and Officer Rowe resulted from any
illicit motivation of the defendants. We recognize that we have not yet decided whether
the Supreme Court's decision in Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562
(2000) (per curiam), altered this Circuit's rule that a "class of one" plaintiff
such as Giordano must show an illicit motivation in order to state a cognizable
equal-protection claim. See Harlen Assocs. v. Inc. Vill. of Mineola, No.
01-7039, 2001 WL 1468777, at *3, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 24808, at *10-*11 (2d Cir. Nov. 16,
2001). We affirm without reaching this issue, however, because Giordano did not in any
event introduce evidence to show that the defendants "intentionally treated
[him] differently from others similarly situated." Olech, 528 U.S. at 564
(emphasis added). Finally, we agree with the district court that contrary to Giordano's
assertion, due process of law did not require the members of the Article II Board to
conduct a personal physical examination of Giordano before recommending his discharge from
Because we hold that Giordano failed to introduce evidence to suggest that the
defendants "regarded him as disabled," we do not reach the other ADA issues
discussed by the district court: whether patrol duty is an "essential function"
of police work, and, if so, whether Giordano was able to perform this function with or
without reasonable accommodation. Finally, we disagree with the district court's
conclusion that Giordano's pendent state-law claims necessarily fail because even though
those laws "have a broader definition of disability than does the ADA," they
otherwise "use the same analytical framework as the ADA." Giordano v. City of
New York, No. 99 Civ. 3649, 2001 WL 204202, at *7, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2039, at *19
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2001). We therefore reverse the district court's grant of summary
judgment against Giordano on his pendent state-law claims and remand with instructions to
dismiss them without prejudice to their renewal in an appropriate state forum.
v. NOCO Motor Fuel, Inc., 263 F.3d 208 (8/2001) Plaintiff Diane
Lovejoy-Wilson, a former employee of defendant NOCO Motor Fuel, Inc. ("NOCO"),
brought an action pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42
U.S.C. § 12101-213, and the New York Human Rights Law ("NYHRL"), New York
Executive Law § 296-301, in the United States District Court for the Western District of
New York alleging that NOCO discriminated against her on the basis of her disability by
constructively discharging her, failing to accommodate her disability, 1
failing to promote her because of her disability, and retaliating against her for
complaining about her treatment. The district court (John T. Curtin, Judge) granted
summary judgment to the plaintiff with respect to her status as a qualified individual
with a disability under the ADA, but granted summary judgment to the defendant on all of
the plaintiff's substantive claims. 2 We affirm the district court's grant of
summary judgment as to the claim for failure to promote to the position of manager; vacate
the district court's order granting summary judgment with respect to the plaintiff's
claims of discrimination based on failure to promote to the position of assistant manager
and retaliation; and dismiss the cross-appeal.
v. S.U.N.Y. Health Sciences Center of Brooklyn, 280 F.3d 98 (9/2001) prior to
today, we have held that a plaintiff may recover money damages under either Title II of
the ADA or § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act upon a showing of a statutory violation
resulting from "deliberate indifference" to the rights secured the disabled by
the acts. Bartlett v. New York State Bd. of Law Examiners, 156 F.3d 321, 331 (2d
Cir. 1998), vacated on other grounds by 527 U.S. 1031 (1999); see also Duvall
v. County of Kitsap, No. 99-35934, 2001 WL 909293, at *9-11, __ F.3d __, __ (9th Cir.
Aug. 14, 2001). Although today's decision alters that holding by requiring proof of
discriminatory animus or ill will for Title II damage claims brought against states,
nothing we have said affects the applicability of the deliberate indifference standard to
Title II claims against non-state governmental entities. Moreover, deliberate indifference
remains the necessary showing for § 504 claims since the Rehabilitation Act was enacted
pursuant to Congress's Spending Clause authority and therefore does not require that
damage remedies be tailored to be congruent and proportional to the proscriptions of the
Second, our holding that private damage claims under Title II require proof of
discriminatory animus or ill will based on disability does not affect Title II's general
applicability to the states, see Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528, 555-57 (1984), as no such challenge was raised in this appeal, cf. Thompson,
258 F.3d at 1255 n.11. Thus, actions by private individuals for injunctive relief for
state violations of Title II have not been foreclosed by today's decision, see Ex
parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); see also Garrett, 121 S.Ct. at 968
v. Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc., 260 F.3d 100 (8/2001) Appellant
Douglas Parker brought this action claiming that his former employer, Sony Pictures
Entertainment, Inc. ("SPE"), discharged him because of his disability in
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (1994
& Supp. 1999) ("the ADA") and the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y.
Exec. Law § 296 (McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1999). Parker also claimed that SPE violated
the ADA by retaliating against him for filing a complaint with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, as well as denied him medical leave in violation of the Family and
Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D) (1999) ("the FMLA").
On September 4, 1998, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York (Lewis A. Kaplan, Judge) granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on
Parker's discriminatory discharge claims and denied Parker's cross-motion for leave to
amend his complaint. The court denied the motion for summary judgment on Parker's other
claims, and denied CPI's motion for summary judgment on the ground that it was not
Parker's employer. For the reasons that follow, we vacate the district court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of SPE on the discriminatory discharge claims, but affirm its
denial of Parker's cross-motion for leave to amend his complaint. We also affirm the
court's denial of summary judgment in favor of CPI.
v. Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc., Dissent 260 F.3d 100 (8/2001)
v. Giuliani, 230 F.3d 543 (10/2000) Plaintiffs, five homeless
individuals who have been diagnosed with clinical symptomatic Human Immunodeficiency Virus
("HIV") or Advanced Immune Deficiency Syndrome ("AIDS"), brought suit
on behalf of themselves and a putative class alleging that various officials of the City
of New York have failed to provide them with emergency housing that accommodates their
disability, as required by Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794
(the "Rehabilitation Act") and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act,
42 U.S.C. § 12131 (the "ADA"). On expedited appeal, they challenge the portion
of a memorandum and order entered June 14, 2000 in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York (Pauley, J.) denying their request for preliminary
injunctive relief. We affirm for the reasons set forth below.
v. New York State Bd. of Law Examiners, 226 F.3d 69 (8/2000) We now
hold that, although the district court properly considered corrective or mitigating
measures such as Bartlett's self-accommodations,>see, e.g., Albertson's,
527 U.S. at 565-66, it nevertheless applied the wrong legal standard when it found that
Bartlett was not substantially limited with respect to reading because she has
"roughly average reading skills (on some measures) when compared to the general
population.">Bartlett I, 970 F.Supp. at 1120. It is not enough that
Bartlett has average skills on "some" measures if her skills are below average
on other measures to an extent that her ability to read is substantially limited. In fact,
the district court found that Bartlett reads "slowly, haltingly, and
laboriously." Id. at 1099; see also id. ("She simply
does not read in the manner of an average person."). Therefore, we remand for the
district court to determine, in the first instance, whether Bartlett is substantially
limited in the major life activity of reading by her slow reading speed, or by any other
"conditions, manner, or duration" that limits her reading "in comparison to
most people." See 28 C.F.R. Pt. 35, App. A, § 35.104 (1999).
We also disagree with the district court's analysis of whether Bartlett was
substantially limited with respect to the major life activity of working. The district
court held that "[i]f plaintiff's disability prevents her from competing on a level
playing field with other bar examination applicants, then her disability has implicated
the major life activity of working." Bartlett I, 970 F.Supp. at 1121. However,
it is not enough for a plaintiff to prove that an impairment "implicates" a
major life activity -- she is required to prove that the impairment "substantially
limits" that activity. In this case, it has not been shown that Bartlett's inability
to practice law results from her reading impairment, rather than from other factors that
might prevent her from passing the bar. Therefore, we remand for the district court to
determine, if necessary, whether it is Bartlett's impairment, rather than factors such as
her education, experience or innate ability, that "substantially limits" her
ability to work.
v. New York State Bd. of Law Examiners, 156 F.3d 321 (9/1998)
v. U.S. Army, 223 F.3d 100 (2000) Philip Bernard Baldwin, who
served in the United States Army from 1985 to 1992, originally filed a complaint against
54 defendants alleging that, over the past twelve years, the defendants had, inter alia,
plotted against him to conceal evidence, to damage his car, and to murder him. The United
States District Court for the Western District of New York (William M. Skretny, Judge)
dismissed Baldwin's complaint after finding that the allegations contained there were
"fantastic, delusional and incredible." The court did, however, permit Baldwin
to file an amended complaint, limiting that complaint to employment discrimination claims
Baldwin might wish to make against the United States Army. The trial court allowed Baldwin
to spell these out because, in his original complaint, Baldwin had appeared to assert a
claim regarding the denial of an EEOC complaint that he had filed. The court thought that
Baldwin, as a pro se litigant, should have an opportunity to assert any claims
associated with this denial that he might have.
Baldwin filed an amended complaint alleging that the Army had violated Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq., the Americans
with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. The
Army then filed a motion to dismiss Baldwin's complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that, because Baldwin's allegations of discrimination
arose out of or were incident to his service in the Army, they were barred. The district
court granted the Army's motion.
Baldwin appeals. He contends that his discrimination claims are not barred. We affirm
the district court's dismissal of Baldwin's suit
v. McGraw-Hill, Inc./Platt's Div., 220 F.3d 61 (2000) The
district court dismissed this employment claim, asserted under, inter alia, the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.,
on the ground that plaintiff failed to reconcile his application for Social Security
disability benefits, which disclaimed ability to work, with the required showing under the
ADA that he is able to perform essential job functions. We affirm.
Phone Taskforce v. F.C.C., 217 F.3d 72 (2000)
v. Staten Island Savings Bank, 207 F.3d 144 (2000) Appeal from
judgments of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Reena
Raggi, Judge ) and the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York (Whitman Knapp, Judge ) dismissing under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) the
respective complaints of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on the sole ground
that Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117, does not
forbid employers from offering long-term disability benefit plans that provide less
coverage for mental and emotional disabilities than for physical disabilities.
v. New York State Dept. of Labor, 205 F.3d 562 (2000) Plaintiff
Patrick C. Jackan appeals from a decision of the United States District Court for the
Northern District of New York (Thomas J. McAvoy, C.J.) entering judgment for
defendant the New York State Department of Labor after a bench trial adjudicating claims
brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act. The District Court rejected the plaintiff's contention that the defendant was
required by these statutes to transfer him to a vacant position on the grounds, inter
alia, that no vacancy existed. The Court of Appeals (Leval, J.) holds that the
plaintiff bears the burden of proving that a vacancy existed and that Jackan did not meet
that burden. Affirmed.
v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 28 (1999) Plaintiffs
Joseph M. Pallozzi and Lori R. Pallozzi appeal from the judgment of the United District
Court for the Northern District of New York (Frederick J. Scullin, Jr., Judge )
dismissing their complaint against Defendant Allstate Life Insurance Company for failure
to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The complaint alleged that Allstate
discriminated against Plaintiffs on the basis of their mental disabilities by refusing to
issue them a joint life insurance policy, thereby violating Title III of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189. The district court questioned whether
Title III was intended to regulate insurance underwriting practices, and ruled that, in
any event, the Act does not prohibit insurers from denying an individual coverage because
of his disability unless the denial lacks actuarial justification. The court dismissed the
complaint because it failed to allege that the denial lacked actuarial justification. The
Court of Appeals, Leval, J., holds (i) Title III of the ADA does regulate insurance
underwriting practices in at least some circumstances, (ii) the McCarran-Ferguson Act does
not bar application of the ADA to insurance underwriting as the ADA "specifically
relates to the business of insurance," and (iii) the district court erred in
dismissing the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Vacated and remanded.
F. v. Israel Discount Bank of New York, 199 F.3d 99 (1999) Plaintiff
Leonard F. appeals from the judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York (Charles L. Brieant, Jr., Judge ) dismissing his complaint
against Defendant The Metropolitan Life Insurance Company under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. The complaint alleged that
MetLife discriminated against Leonard F. on the basis of his mental disability in
violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189,
by furnishing him a disability policy as a benefit of his employment (at a bank) that
limited coverage for mental disabilities to two years without similarly limiting coverage
for physical disabilities. The district court held that, because MetLife's policy is
consistent with state law and does not constitute a subterfuge to evade the purposes of
the Act, MetLife is exempt from Plaintiff's Title III claim under the "safe
harbor" provision of Section 501(c) of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c). The Court of
Appeals, Leval, J., holds the district court correctly interpreted the term
"subterfuge," in accordance with the Supreme Court's decision in Public
Employees Retirement Sys. v. Betts , 492
U.S. 158, 171 (1989), as inapplicable to insurance policies adopted prior to the
enactment of the ADA; however, the court erred in dismissing Plaintiff's claim under Fed.
R. Civ. P. (12)(b)(6) based on its finding that MetLife adopted its policy prior to the
ADA's enactment, because the court relied on matter outside the pleadings to make this
finding and failed to afford Plaintiff an opportunity to take discovery and contest the
issue. Vacated and remanded for determination whether MetLife adopted the policy in
question prior to enactment of the ADA.
v. Queens Village Committee for Mental Health for Jamaica Community Adolescent Program,
Inc., 198 F.3d 68 (1999) The question presented is whether an
employee who was known by his employer to have lymphoma, but who had not become
symptomatic at the time he was fired, can proceed with a discriminatory discharge claim
under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. ("ADA").
Plaintiff Robert Heyman appeals from a judgment of the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York (Sterling Johnson, Jr., Judge ),
granting defendants' motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's claim under the ADA and
declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims under New York
State and local law. The District Court held that plaintiff had not established a prima
facie case that he was "disabled" as the term is defined under the ADA. We
conclude that plaintiff has established a prima facie case that defendants regarded him as
impaired, thus satisfying one of the statutory definitions of "disabled."
Accordingly, we vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings.
v. Douglas Elliman-Gibbons & Ives, Inc., 183 F.3d 155 (1999) Plaintiff
Michael Sarno appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York, Robert L. Carter, Judge , dismissing his complaint alleging
that defendant Douglas Elliman-Gibbons & Ives, Inc. ("DEGI"), discriminated
and retaliated against him in violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act
("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq . (1994), and alleging that DEGI
terminated his employment without giving him notice of the amount of leave to which he was
entitled under the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA" or the "Act"),
29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq . (1994). The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of DEGI, dismissing the ADA claims on the ground that Sarno had not adduced evidence
of a disability within the scope of the ADA, and dismissing the FMLA claim on the ground
that Sarno had received every substantive benefit to which he was entitled under that Act.
On appeal, Sarno pursues his contention that the termination of his employment violated
his rights under the FMLA, and he contends that there were genuine issues of fact to be
tried as to his ADA retaliation claim. Finding no basis for reversal, we affirm.
Adams v. Citizens Advice Bureau, 187 F.3d 315 (1999)
v. Washingtonville Cent. School Dist., 190 F.3d 1 (1999) Lawrence
A. Mitchell, Jr. appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York (Barrington D. Parker, Jr., J. ) granting summary
judgment to Defendant-Appellee Washingtonville Central School District. Mitchell brought a
claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et
seq ., following the termination of his employment as Head Custodian at the
Washingtonville High School. In granting summary judgment, the district court held that
based on Mitchell's prior representations to the New York Workers' Compensation Board and
the United States Social Security Administration in obtaining benefits that he was unable
to work because he could not stand or walk, Mitchell was judicially estopped from
asserting in the present ADA action that he could function other than in a sedentary
position. Concluding that Mitchell therefore failed to show that he was able to perform
the essential functions of the Head Custodian position and so make out a prima facie case
under the ADA, the district court dismissed his claim. We affirm.
v Costello, 187 F3d 298 (1999) The Court in
holding that the ADA does not violate the 11th Amendment stated "the
anti-discrimination provisions of the ADA provide a narrowly tailored and reasonable
response to the problem of discrimination against people with disabilities."
Lai v. New York City Government, 163 F.3d 729 (1998). It is not a violation of
the ADA for New York City to grant a special parking permit to severely handicapped
individuals who are either NYC residents, attend school in NYC or work in NYC. Plaintiff's
New Jersey disability parking permit was valid in New York State but did not convey the
same privileges as the NYC permit. Court held discrimination was not based on disability
but on residence.
v. Suffolk County Police Department, 158 F.3d 635 (1998). Court
reversed verdict for three police officers in a jury trial that they were denied
promotions as a result of discrimination in violation of the ADA. Court held that the
evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to show officers were disabled within the
meaning of the ADA.
v. New York State Bd. of Law Examiners, 156 F.3d 321 (1998).
Bar exam applicant with a learning disability was disabled within the meaning of the ADA
and entitled to accommodations in taking the bar exam. She was also entitled to
compensatory damages and reimbursement for those examinations she took without
v. Pfrommer, 148 F.3d 73 (1998).
v. Health and Hospitals Corp., 147 F.3d 165 (1998). Court
dismissed action brought under 504 and ADA by association and individuals parents of
disabled children challenging closing of a specialized health care facility that treated
children with developmental disabilities. Court held that plaintiffs failed to state a
claim since they only alleged that closing the facility would reduce care but did not
allege that ant plaintiff, by reason of disability, was being denied care furnished to
individuals without disabilities.
v. Johnson Controls World Services, Inc., 140 F.3d 144 (1998). Plaintiff's
mental impairment, panic disorder with agoraphobia, did not qualify as a disability under
the ADA. Everyday mobility as narrowly defined to fit the circumstances of plaintiff's
impairment was not major life activity within the meaning of the ADA. Plaintiff's
condition did, however, constitute disability within the meaning of the New York Human
v. Grae & Rybicki, P.C., 135 F.3d 867 (1998). Employee
who suffered from colitis was not disabled under the ADA. Assuming that ability to control
elimination of bodily waste was major life activity under the ADA, such activity was not
substantially limited by plaintiff's colitis nor did it substantially limit her ability to
care for herself.
v. City of Meriden, 129 F.3d 281 (1997). Firefighter
fired for not meeting weight standard did not allege he was disabled nor that his employer
perceived him as disabled and therefore could not maintain claim under the ADA.
v. City of Mount Vernon, 118 F.3d 92 (1997). Firefighter
sued city and fire department under ADA and 504 for refusing to assign him to a light duty
position after an accident left him a paraplegic. District Court granted defendants
Summary Judgment holding plaintiff could not perform the essential functions of a
firefighter. Court of Appeals vacated judgement and remanded because there were genuine
issues of fact as to whether fire suppression is an essential function of a position in
certain of the fire department's specialized bureaus and whether the department could
reasonable accommodate him by assigning him to such a position.
Health Systems, Inc. v. City of White Plains, 117 F.3d 37 (1997). City
denied building permit for drug and alcohol rehabilitation center. Court found that ADA
and 504 applied to city's zoning decisions. Plaintiffs demonstrated requisite irreparable
harm for injunctive relief. Center had standing under ADA and 504 and offered evidence of
city's discriminatory motives in denying building permit.
v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 91 F.3d 379 (1996). Plaintiff
sued employer under ADA and 504 alleging failure to accommodate her back problems. Court
upheld grant of summary judgment for employer. Employer had provided plaintiff with
ergonomic furniture as well as allowing her to move around and stretch periodically.
v. Metro-North Commuter R. Co., 80 F.3d 50 (1996). Court
found employee who sued under 504 was not discharged because of his drug/alcohol dependent
disability but because of excessive absenteeism.
v. Gloeckler, 68 F.3d 61 (1995). 504 does
not preclude providing different benefits to individuals based upon their disability. It
only requires that disabled individuals not be denied benefits provided non-disabled
individuals. Plaintiff's denial of funding for a van modification by the vocational
rehabilitation agency was not based upon his disability but on his inability to drive
which the court held is not a major life activity.
v. McDonald's Corp., 51 F.3d 353 (1995). Court
reversed dismissal by district court of plaintiff's suit seeking total ban of smoking in
fast food restaurants. Court held that determination of whether a modification is required
under the ADA is reasonable involved fact-specific, case by case inquiry. The ADA did not
preclude public accommodations from banning smoke for those with smoke sensitive
allergies. Plaintiffs stated triable cause of action for violation of ADA based on
allowing smoking in restaurants.
Heilweil v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 32 F.3d 718 (1994). The
court affirmed the lower court decision dismissing plaintiff's claim of discrimination
because plaintiff was not a handicapped person under the 504 of the Act. Plaintiff
established that she was a person with a handicap (asthma) under 504. However, she failed
to show that her handicap affected the major life activity of working. She could not work
in the blood bank of the defendant hospital because of the fumes. However, she
acknowledged she could work elsewhere in the hospital where she was free from the fumes
found in the blood bank.
Marshall v. Switzer, 10 F.3d 925 (1993). Plaintiff
could bring 1983 action to enforce his rights under Title I of the Rehabilitation Act
against state vocational rehabilitation agency.
Cushing v. Moore, 970 F.2d 1103 (1992). Court
affirmed lower courts dismissal of plaintiffs' claims that defendant's termination of
their take home methadone treatment violated 504. Defendant terminated plaintiffs'
treatment based on their unemployment whereas plaintiffs' claimed that their unemployment
was a direct result of their disability (drug addiction.) Court held the rehabilitation
act does not create a cause of action based on a handicap that is directly related to
providing the very service at issue.
Guice-Mills v. Derwinski, 967 F.2d 794 (1992). Plaintiff
was an individual with a handicap under 504 because depressive illness and medication
regime interfered with her ability to arrive at work on time. However, her condition
rendered her not otherwise qualified for the position of head nurse. Defendant's offer to
reassign her as a staff nurse for a shift compatible with her medical condition at no
decrease in grade, salary or benefits constituted a reasonable accommodation.
Gilbert v. Frank, 949 F.2d 637 (1991). Court
found plaintiff was disabled under the act in that "persons whose kidneys would cease
to function without mechanical assistance, or whose kidneys do not function sufficiently
to rid their bodies of waste matter without regular dialysis" are substantially
limited in their ability to care for themselves. Despite this finding, the court held that
plaintiff was not otherwise qualified for the job of Mail Distribution Clerk because he
not meet the lifting requirements of the job. Reasonable accommodation does not mean
elimination of any of the job's essential functions.
Marsh v. Skinner, 922 F.2d 112 (1990). Plaintiff
who suffered from a mental impairment sued defendant under 504 because defendant granted
half fare benefits to physically handicapped. Court found he was not otherwise qualified
because he did not meet the definition of handicapped in the Mass Transportation Act which
defined handicapped individuals as being unable without special planning or special
facilities or design to utilize public transportation facilities and services effectively.
P.C. v. McLaughlin, 913 F.2d 1033 (1990). Rehabilitation
Act does not require all handicapped persons to be provided with identical benefits. The
central purpose of 504 is to assure that handicapped individuals receive evenhanded
treatment in relation to the non-handicapped.
Rothschild v. Grottenthaler, 907 F.2d 286 (1990). School
district was required to provide sign language interpreters for the deaf parents of
hearing children at certain school initiated activities related to a child's academic
and/or disciplinary progress but not graduation.
U.S. v. University Hosp., State University of New York at Stony Brook, 729 F.2d
144 (1984). Plaintiff was not entitled to
handicapped infant's medical records under 504 whose parents had refused to consent to
corrective surgical procedures.
Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 687 F.2d 644 (1982). The
Court, in reversing the lower court, held that plaintiffs, representing all wheelchair
bound handicapped individuals, stated a cause of action against defendants under 504 for
failure to make the special efforts required by federal law toward making mass transit in
New York City available to the elderly and handicapped. 504 does require at least modest
affirmative steps to accommodate the handicapped. Remanded for further proceedings.
Doe v. New York University, 666 F.2d 761 (1981). Lower
court denied plaintiff who had a mental disability a preliminry injunction against
defendant and granted summary judgment to defendant. Plaintiff had been asked to withdraw
as a medical student from defendant. Court affirmed the denial of injunction holding
plaintiff had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits. Court also reversed the
grant of summary judgement to defendant. While finding that defendant would be likely to
prevail at trial, material facts relied upon by defendant are not attested to on personal
New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 612 F.2d 644 (1979).
Rehabilitation Act was violated by excluding certain
mentally retarded children from regular school classes because they were carriers of serum